Narrative and Critical History of America, Vol. 6 (of 8) / The United States of North America, Part I

by Unknown

This ill-success of Landais was a good enough illustration of the danger of entrusting seamen of one nation to a commander from another. Either this danger or some other consideration prevented the French government from employing Jones. But the hope of such service was so constant with him that he took no command from the government of the United States for some time. And thus his service, which might have been of great importance, was lost, while he was dangling in antechambers.

These conflicts on the coast of Europe attracted, as has been said, more of the attention of Europe than the naval battles between England and America in other seas. But the years 1777 and 1778 had not passed without frequent naval engagements on the American coast, some of them of considerable importance. In May, 1777, Manly took the "Hancock" and "Boston", frigates from the port of Boston, with which he captured the English frigate "Fox." The three vessels looked into the harbor of Halifax, and drew into action the "Rainbow", the "Flora", and the "Victor", a superior force. The two smaller American vessels escaped, but the "Hancock" was sacrificed.

The "Raleigh", one of the thirteen frigates built for the Continent, had, as the reader knows, made a successful cruise in the end of 1777. The next year, with the "Alfred", one of the little favorites in the beginning of the war, she sailed from France. Both vessels were overtaken by a superior English force, and the "Alfred" was lost, though the "Raleigh" succeeded in reaching Boston. At that time most of the naval force of the Congress was in Boston harbor. It consisted of but three vessels, the "Warren", the "Raleigh", and the "Deane", each of thirty-two guns. The State of Massachusetts had in the same harbor the "Tyrannicide", the "Independent", the "Sampson", and the "Hancock", of fourteen guns and of twenty. But besides this little fleet, so insignificant in itself, hundreds of privateers were afloat, many of them of force nearly equal to the largest of the vessels which have been named.

It had been the hope of Franklin in Paris, of Paul Jones, his naval adviser, and of the court to which they both gave counsel, that D'Estaing's fleet might arrive off Delaware Bay in time to shut up the English fleet there. The same issue was feared in England.[1247] But D'Estaing was just too late. He arrived on the 7th of July off the capes; he only landed his passengers, Deane, and Gérard, the new French minister, and without even watering his fleet followed the English fleet to New York. Had he entrapped them in the Delaware, a crisis like that of Yorktown might have come three years earlier.

But the harbor of New York was too well protected by the intricacies of its channels to make an attack possible. D'Estaing remained in the offing off Sandy Hook for some days, and then bore away for Newport. His coöperation with the army of Sullivan is described in another place.[1248]

A full letter from Cooper to Franklin exists among the Franklin papers,[1249] which gives D'Estaing's own view of the transactions which followed, and that view is probably substantially correct. When he threatened the English fleet in New York Bay, it consisted of six ships of the line, six fifty-gun ships, two of forty-four guns, with smaller vessels. When he entered Newport Bay the English burned the "Orpheus", the "Lark", the "Cerberus", and the "King-Fisher",—of various force, from thirty-two guns to twenty,—and several smaller vessels. When, in conjunction with Sullivan, D'Estaing attacked the town, the English burned the "Grand Duke" and the "Flora", of thirty-two guns, with fifteen transports. While he was in Newport Bay, Byron's English fleet reinforced the fleet in New York, and they were now strong enough to retaliate on D'Estaing and give to him the challenge which he had so lately given to them. With a fleet of thirty-six sail, fourteen of which were double-deckers, they appeared off Newport.

D'Estaing was not averse to a contest. On the 10th of August, with the advantage of a fresh north wind, he took his squadron to sea. The English admiral, Howe, slipped his cables and went to sea also. D'Estaing did not avoid a battle, and, in the gale which followed, engaged the rear of the English fleet. But his own flag-ship, the "Languedoc", was dismasted in the gale, and, after communicating with Sullivan again, he went round to Boston to refit.

Samuel Cooper, in writing the letter to which we have alluded, is well aware that there was some popular disappointment because the Count D'Estaing had not done more. But he resumes the whole by saying: "The very sound of his aid occasioned the evacuation of Philadelphia by the British army; his presence suspended the operation of a vast British force in these States, by sea and land; it animated our own efforts; it protected our coast and navigation, obliging the enemy to keep their men-of-war and cruisers collected, and facilitated our necessary supplies from abroad. By drawing the powerful squadron of Admiral Byron to these seas, it gave security to the islands of France in the West Indies, an equilibrium to her naval power in the Channel, and a decided superiority in the Mediterranean."

When it is remembered that, in the events of the summer and autumn, the English lost twenty vessels in their collisions with D'Estaing's fleet, it must be granted that its exploits were by no means inconsiderable.