The far-reaching influence of the Indian superintendents restrained this aboriginal population from violent outbreak from 1764 until the collision at Point Pleasant, Virginia, in 1774. This was undoubtedly precipitated by atrocities committed upon the Indians in the Ohio Valley, near Wheeling. Underlying the immediate causes for irritation during this period were reasons for complaint, revealed in the correspondence of Sir William Johnson, which would probably have led to warfare at an early date. Among these was the influx of settlers upon the hunting-grounds of the Indians, where, regardless of treaties, the land across the Ohio was parcelled out in "tomahawk improvements", as the squatter rights of the day were denominated. These proceedings attracted the attention of General Gage, and on the 8th of August, 1772, he issued a proclamation, calling attention to the fact that some persons had "undertaken to make settlements beyond the boundaries fixed by treaties made with the Indian nations", "where they lead a wandering life, without government and without laws", "causing infinite disturbance." Such persons were ordered to "quit these countries instantly and without delay, and to retire at their choice into some one of the colonies of his majesty." The peace which was negotiated by Lord Dunmore brought but little quiet to the settlers on the border. Indian raids were frequent, and the details of their horrors are sickening, but the loss of life by these raids has been greatly exaggerated. The Indians seldom ventured beyond the region which was scantily peopled. The watchfulness of the settlers, and their promptness to assemble and pursue, averted many disasters. At such a time Virginia and Pennsylvania were wrangling over the right to grant patents for land, the settlement of which had so much to do with the uneasiness of the Indians.[1268]
In New York, settlements were more compact. Rights of territory were better defined and better understood. Indian lands had been better protected there from direct invasion and from fraudulent transfer. Danger from trespass was better appreciated. The Indians themselves, being under the personal oversight of their superintendent, were better controlled. His immediate presence made him more useful in the adjustment of disputes without resort to the tomahawk. The frontier patriots of Tryon County, "unlike the rude inhabitants of most frontier settlements", are stated by a careful student of the records to have been "scrupulous in their devotion to the supremacy of the laws." The confederacy of the Six Nations, as a whole, had not participated in the events in the valley of the Ohio, but they shared with their dependants and allies in the uneasiness caused by such aggressions upon Indian territory. Some of their warriors had taken part in the Virginia war, and the "temper of the whole Indian race, with the exception of the Oneidas, was soured by these occurrences of the year 1774." The first official labors of importance which devolved upon Colonel Guy Johnson, who, after the death of Sir William Johnson in 1774, had been appointed to the office of superintendent, were to check the resentment of the Six Nations.[1269] His success in those labors showed that he had inherited, by virtue of his office, some of the respect and affection which the natives had lavished upon his predecessor.
Such was the condition of affairs when Washington took command of the army, in July, 1775, with instructions not to disband any of the forces already raised, until further directions from Congress. It is not probable that all the members of the Congress were aware of the full meaning of these instructions. There were among the men whom Washington was thus instructed not to discharge a number of Indians regularly enlisted as minute-men. Had the question of employing Indians been submitted to Congress at that time, it would probably have been answered in the negative; but it had already been settled by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts Bay when they accepted the services of Indians.[1270]
On the first day of April, 1775, the Committee on the State of the Province reported to that congress a resolve beginning with these words: "Whereas a number of Indians, natives of the town of Stockbridge, have enlisted as minute-men." A committee was next appointed to draft a letter to the Rev. Mr. Kirkland,[1271] and to frame an address to the chief of the Mohawk tribes. The letter requests Mr. Kirkland to use his influence with the Six Nations "to join with us in the defence of our rights;" but if he could not "prevail with them to take an active part in this glorious cause", he was "at least to engage them to stand neuter." The address calls upon the Indians to "whet their hatchet, and be prepared to defend our liberties and lives."
It is evident that the Stockbridge Indians were further importuned,[1272] for on the 11th of April their chief sachem answered a communication from the President of the Provincial Congress (the contents of which can only be conjectured) by offering to visit the Six Nations and find out how they stood. "If I find that they are against you", he said, "I will try and turn their minds."... "One thing I ask of you, if you send for me to fight, that you will let me fight in my own Indian way." The Massachusetts Congress also tried to draw recruits from the Indians of Nova Scotia, and addressed them on the 15th of May, 1775,[1273] as their "friends and good brothers;" adding as an inducement for their enlistment that "the Indians at Stockbridge all join with us, and some of their men have enlisted as soldiers." Captain John Lane was sent down among these Eastern Indians to raise one company of their men, "to join with us in the war with your and our enemies." Nothing, however, resulted from this, except the arrival in June of Captain Lane with one chief and three young men, and at a later date the execution of a barren treaty.[1274] In addition to these efforts put forth by the Provincial Congress, attempts were early made in the same direction by provincial officers;[1275] and thus by general or special effort at the very beginning of the war, the Americans secured the services of such Indians as were willing to enlist, and the English followed so close in their steps as to confound, to the casual observer of their mutual criminations, the evidence of priority. The Indians engaged upon the American side produced no material influence upon military movements. Their presence in camp has been ignored by many writers. The responsibility for the intention is the same as if the effort had been successful. It must, however, be remembered that small bodies of Indians, serving with whites, were controllable and easily restrained from excesses. After the evacuation of Boston, the tide of events changed the field of war, and altered the composition of the troops. The army began to assume a national aspect. The voice of Massachusetts was no longer pre-eminent in military affairs.
The Continental Congress contained representatives of other colonies who keenly felt the dangers from the use of Indians by the enemy. The expressions of opinion in that body were, therefore, much more conservative than in the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts Bay. On the 18th of May it appears by the Journals that indubitable evidence of a design formed by the British ministry of making an invasion had been received. In June, according to the Secret Journals, Governor Carleton was making preparation to invade the colonies, and was "instigating the Indian nations to take up the hatchet against them." On the 30th the Committee on Indian Affairs was instructed "to prepare proper talks to the several tribes of Indians for engaging the continuance of their friendship to us, and neutrality in our present unhappy dispute with Great Britain." On the 1st of July there is a hint of a possible change of position shown in the passage of a resolution, "that in case any agent of the ministry shall induce any Indian tribes, or any of them, to commit actual hostilities against these colonies, or to enter into an offensive alliance with the British troops, thereupon the colonies ought to avail themselves of an alliance with such Indian nations as will enter into the same, to oppose such British troops and their allies." The statement that Carleton was instigating the Indians to "fall upon us" was repeated July 6th.[1276] On July 12th the Committee on Indian Affairs recommended that the country be divided into three Indian departments, and that commissioners be appointed, with power to "treat with the Indians in their respective departments, in the name and on behalf of the United Colonies, in order to preserve peace and friendship with the said Indians, and to prevent their taking any part in the present commotion." This recommendation was adopted. On July 13th, a formal speech was addressed to the Six Confederate Nations, urging them to keep peace. On the 17th the commissioners were recommended to employ Mr. Kirkland, in order to secure the friendship of the Indians and continue them in a state of neutrality. On July 21st a plan of confederation was submitted to Congress by Franklin, in which "a perpetual alliance, offensive and defensive", was proposed, "to be entered into as soon as may be with the Six Nations." On December 2d it was resolved that the Indians of the St. Francis, Penobscot, Stockbridge, and St. John and other tribes may be called on in case of real necessity, and that giving them presents is suitable and proper. On March 8, 1776, the growing disposition to make use of Indians found expression in a resolve "that Indians be not employed as soldiers in the armies of the United Colonies, before the tribes to which they belong shall, in a national council, held in the customary manner, have consented thereto, nor then without express approbation of Congress." On May 25th the opposition seems to have been completely overcome, when Congress resolved "that it is highly expedient to engage the Indians in the service of the United Colonies."[1277] On June 3d authority was conferred upon General Washington to employ in Canada a number of Indians, not exceeding two thousand; and on the 6th instructions were given to the standing Committee on Indian Affairs to devise ways and means for carrying into effect the resolution of the 3d. Meantime the news of the disaster at the Cedars was received, and its circumstances impelled Congress to special efforts in behalf of the colonies. On June 14th the commissioners of the Northern Department were instructed to "engage the Six Nations in our interest, on the best terms that can be procured." On the 17th, the restriction in the resolution of the 3d, which limited to Canada the use of the Indians to be raised, was removed, and the general was permitted to employ them in any place where he should judge they would be most useful. He was further authorized "to offer a reward of one hundred dollars for every commissioned officer, and thirty dollars for every private soldier of the king's troops, that they should take prisoners in the Indian country, or on the frontiers of these colonies." The days of irresolution were over. Congress was now irrevocably committed to the proposition of permitting the general commanding the armies to take what advantage he could of Indian auxiliaries, and to offer them bounties for prisoners. The next utterance of Congress on this subject is to be found in the Declaration of Independence, in which the king is arraigned because "he has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions." This was closely followed by a resolution on July 8th, authorizing Washington to call forth and engage the Indians of the St. John, Nova Scotia, and Penobscot tribes. The address to the people of Great Britain was adopted the same day. The address to the people of Ireland, in which it is asserted that "the wild and barbarous savages of the wilderness have been solicited by gifts to take up the hatchet against us, and instigated to deluge our settlements with the blood of defenceless women and children", was agreed to July 28, 1776.[1278] After this, the acts and resolutions of Congress were consistent with the resolution in which they declared that it was highly expedient to employ the Indians. Instructions were given from time to time to secure the greatest advantage out of the services of the Indians, in behalf of the country which was now struggling for independence; and in 1779 it was resolved that twelve blank commissions be furnished the commissioners of the Northern Department for the appointment of as many Indians, the name and the rank of each commission to be filled at the discretion of the commissioners.[1279]
The English approached the question differently; and there can be but little doubt that the proposition to use Indian warriors was more shocking to the cultivated Englishman, who was in no danger from their barbarous excesses, than to the American of corresponding attainments, whose life had been spent in close contact with men to whom such incidents had been every-day experiences. The fierce invectives of Chatham,[1280] in 1777, against the ministry for having enlisted the services of Indians, were founded on a proper estimate of the responsibilities of an invading army. Lord North recognized this distinction when, in 1775, he said that Carleton raised Indians only for purposes of defence. Military men knew that the natives, who had taken part in every war in America between the French and the English, must inevitably be drawn into any protracted contest between Great Britain and the colonies. It could be foreseen that, if the English retained Canada and Detroit, operations would be conducted by way of Lake Champlain, Oswego, and Detroit, which would involve the use of Indian territory. If any inference could be drawn from the past, no armed occupation of strategic positions within Indian territory, and no use of the rivers and natural highways of the back country for military purposes during a time of actual war, could be made without collision with the natives, unless such occupation and use was by their consent. Such consent could only be gained by alliance. General Gage and Lord Dunmore, both in close contact with the situation, placed their opinions on record soon after hostilities broke out. On June, 12, 1775, Gage wrote to Lord Dartmouth: "I hear that the rebels, after surprising Ticonderoga, made incursions and commenced hostilities upon the frontier of the province of Quebec, which will justify General Carleton to raise bodies of Canadians and Indians to attack them in return; and we need not be tender of calling on the savages, as the rebels here have shown us the example, by bringing as many Indians down here as they could collect." Lord Dunmore, whose indiscretions and brutality were so serviceable in stamping out loyalty among men of wealth and intelligence in Virginia, sought no justification in the example of the rebels. He wrote to the Earl of Dartmouth, on May 1st, that he hoped "to be able to collect from among Indians, negroes, and other persons a force sufficient, if not to subdue rebellion, at least to defend government;" and in the fall of the same year he endeavored to carry out his policy.[1281] Carleton was apparently averse to the employment of Indians in aggressive movements. At any rate, he took refuge behind his orders, which did not permit him "to act out of the line of the province."
Colonel Guy Johnson was the object of much suspicion during the months of May and June, 1775. He repudiated with vigor the position which these suspicions attributed to him, and said that he could not sufficiently express his surprise at those who had, either through malice or ignorance, misconstrued his intentions, and supposed him capable of setting Indians on the peaceable inhabitants of Tryon County. He was a servant of the king and an ardent loyalist. From the mere performance of his official duties he was necessarily an object of suspicion to the Americans. He was the person who furnished the natives with supplies. "We get our things from the superintendent. If our ammunition is stopped we shall distrust you", said an Indian speaker to the delegates from Albany and Tryon counties. These supplies were furnished by the king to those whom he termed his allies. It was evident that the king would not continue to furnish supplies, if their only effect was to keep the neighboring Indians on good terms with colonists who, while claiming to be loyal subjects, were actually in arms against his government. As the distributer of supplies, the safety of the superintendent was of great importance to the natives, and a rumor that the "Bostonians" contemplated seizing his person[1282] caused the Indians much alarm. Whether Johnson believed this rumor or not, he fortified his house. This act, as well as his sudden removal to Fort Stanwix, and thence to Oswego,—at both of which places he held conferences with Indians,—increased the numbers who doubted the sincerity of his statements. Yet even here, after these suspicious movements, he protested to the Provincial Congress of New York against the charges brought against him: "I trust I shall always manifest more humanity than to promote the destruction of the innocent inhabitants of a colony to which I have been always warmly attached." The conference at Oswego caused alarm to the inhabitants of Tryon County, and the air was filled with rumors of Indian invasion. Colonel Johnson reported to Dartmouth that he left home the last of May, "having received secret instructions from General Gage", and that he "assembled 1,458 Indians at Ontario,[1283] and adjusted matters with them in such a manner that they agreed to defend the communications and assist his majesty's troops in their operations." At the Albany conference the Indians were interrogated about the proceedings at Oswego, and repeatedly asserted that the superintendent's advice to them was to preserve neutrality.[1284] The statements made by the Indians at the conferences were generally to be relied upon. Johnson's language has perhaps been misunderstood. The assistance "to his majesty's troops in their operations" may have been limited to the agreement to defend the communications, the military value of which Johnson appreciated, but the full effect of an agreement to defend which the Indians did not comprehend. In the middle of July, Johnson arrived at Montreal, and another conference was held with 1,664 Indians, at which their services were secured for the king. Brant, who was present, afterwards said: "We immediately commenced in good earnest, and did our utmost during the war."
In the South, John Stuart, the Indian superintendent of that department, was also an object of suspicion. At a hint from friends he fled from Charleston to Savannah, and in turn to St. Augustine. From this spot, on July 18th, he wrote to the Committee of Safety of Charleston, asserting that he had never received any orders from his superiors "which, by the most tortured suspicion, could be interpreted to stir up or employ the Indians to fall upon the frontier inhabitants, or to take any part in the disputes between Great Britain and the colonies."[1285] A few weeks later he received from Gage a letter written just before that officer left Boston, the vindictiveness of which was probably prompted by anger. This letter contained instructions to "improve a correspondence with the Indians to the greatest advantage, and even when opportunity offers make them take arms against his majesty's enemies, and distress them all in your power; for no terms are now to be kept with them; they have brought down all the savages they could against us here, who, with their riflemen, are continually firing on our advanced sentries;[1286] in short, no time should be lost to distress a set of people so wantonly rebellious."[1287] Stuart apparently proceeded to carry out what he conceived to be the desires of his superior officer, and, in a letter of October 3d, reported progress.
From England instructions were forwarded on July 5, 1775, by Lord Dartmouth to Colonel Johnson, "to keep the Indians in such a state of affection and attachment to the king as that his majesty may rely upon their assistance in any case in which it may be necessary." On the 24th Dartmouth wrote: "The intelligence his majesty has received of the rebels having excited the Indians to take a part, and of their having actually engaged a body of them in arms to support their rebellion, justifies the resolution his majesty has taken of requiring the assistance of his faithful adherents, the Six Nations. It is, therefore, his majesty's pleasure that you do lose no time in taking such steps as may induce them to take up the hatchet against his majesty's rebellious subjects in America, and to engage them in his majesty's service, upon such plan as shall be suggested by General Gage." This work Johnson had already accomplished even before the instructions of July 24th were written. In the fall of the same year that Dartmouth thus placed the British government on record as willing to employ Indians in the war, without other restrictions than such as were to be suggested by General Gage, the Earl of Shelburne, on information received, attacked the administration. "The Indians had been tampered with", he said. "A trial of skill had been made to let the savages on the back settlements loose on provincial subjects. Barbarous as was the measure and cowardly as was the attempt, it had failed." This was on November 10th. Ten days later Lord North asserted that, "as to the means of conducting the war, there was never any idea of employing the negroes or the Indians, until the Americans themselves had first applied to them; that General Carleton did then apply to them; and even then it was only for the defence of his own province." Lord North was not well informed on proceedings in the colonies.