MR. LITTLEPAGE: Mr. President, in view of this information about the chestnut, is there the slightest use in the world for this Association to encourage anybody to plant chestnuts anywhere in the United States?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kellerman is here, and I wish to refer to him Mr. Littlepage's question with a slight addition. Is there, first, any prospect of any place staying immune? Second, would it not be to the advantage of the country if the sale of chestnut stock were stopped?
DR. KARL F. KELLERMAN: Mr. President, to answer those questions involves a rather large contract on my part. (Laughter). In the first place, the problem of growing and marketing chestnuts, I think, is one that I could hardly be expected fairly to discuss. I am here rather to explain the attitude and action of the Federal Horticultural Board than to try to give any constructive advice to the nut growers.
The Federal Horticultural Board is a board of five men to advise the Secretary of Agriculture in establishing plant quarantines, either on the introduction of plant material into the United States, or on the movement of plant material inside the United States within the quarantined areas. The Horticultural Board, therefore, has to deal more with actual conditions than with outlining such policies as your chairman has asked me to outline.
THE PRESIDENT: Excuse me, Dr. Kellerman, but we wish to know if there is, in your opinion, any prospect of any region remaining immune?
DR. KELLERMAN: Well, even that is going rather further than I would like to go, and yet the negative answer to that question is practically the basis on which the Federal Horticultural Board decided that it was impracticable to quarantine infected areas at the present time. The evidence at hand appears to indicate conclusively that if the trees that are to be grown are distinctly susceptible to the disease they will almost certainly have an opportunity to become infected, no matter what part of the United States they may be grown in. Now, whether that infection would be a matter of a few months, or a few years, or a few decades, of course, would be altogether a matter of chance, but, with the wide distribution of nursery stock that is infected, with native chestnuts rather generally infected and continuing to be infected, and with practically no chance of preventing the continuation of the disease in the native chestnuts, abundant sources for infection of susceptible material appear to exist. For that reason, it appears to be, from an economic standpoint, inadvisable to attempt to check the disease through the establishment of quarantines.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kellerman, you have answered my first question to perfection, and now I want to ask the second one. If this blight is practically a sure-kill, isn't it wrong to permit people to spend money in the hope that, in some way, they are going to escape it? And if that is the case, why shouldn't the whole traffic in chestnut trees be stopped, with the possible exception of experimental things, which might be allowed with the direct permission of some governmental board?
DR. KELLERMAN: That is a question that is very much harder to answer. There might be favored regions where orchard culture of the chestnut could go on for a considerable term of years before infections became general and before the industry would be stifled because of this disease. That is merely a matter of conjecture, as I see it. We have so little evidence as to the speed with which a paying orchard business can be developed in a new locality, so little evidence as to how the disease may act under widely separated climatic conditions, that I don't feel that we are prepared to say definitely that the industry is bound to fail in every place where it is tried. Personally, I think that it ought to be considered only on an experimental basis, but that represents merely my personal opinion, and I doubt whether there is any effective means for establishing a policy of that sort. It might be possible for the general advice to be given that there was danger in any orchard planting of chestnuts, no matter where it might be undertaken, and of a comparatively rapid loss through the chestnut blight. I doubt whether more than that would be feasible.
THE PRESIDENT: I have been enthusiastic over the chestnut for twenty years this season, and these are matters in which I am greatly interested. As I see it, the problem is one that is really much bigger than the chestnut. The whole field of nut growing, which is now on the edge of great accomplishments, is likely to be seriously injured, because the most conspicuous thing in nut growing is the taking advertisement of the firm whose bad trees have been referred to by Dr. Metcalf. I think we do not appreciate the seriousness of the situation. The firm Dr. Metcalf referred to is selling trees that are diseased in places where they are sure to die quickly. Other men are similarly selling trees, with less skillful advertising, perhaps, but probably no less diseased. Most of these nurserymen may be honest in their belief that they are putting out stock that is not diseased. But in the infant trees it is almost impossible to detect the blight, so that the tree goes out looking like a perfectly good one. It may be two or three seasons before it dies.
Now, the economic aspects are these: Who should stand the loss, the man in the nursery or the man in the orchard? It is a toss-up, it seems to me at present, with the results apparently in favor of the nurseryman rather than in favor of the citizen. The people who have an interest in nut growing are going to have that interest lessened or destroyed by beginning with a bad kind of tree. There are possibilities of a great national injury, as I see it, if we let this thing go on.