The part played by the New Glasgow works of the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company in the Great War is an interesting one. At the beginning of hostilities in August, 1914, there were only two Steel Companies in the United States who had either the plant or experience to produce either shells or armor plates, while none of the Canadian steel plants had any experience whatever.
The first production of munition material, by way of shells and shell steel, was undertaken in Canada by the Shell Committee, and the story of the experiments carried on in the early days of September, 1914, which resulted in convincing the British War Office that basic steel, as made in Canada, would meet all the requirements of both shrapnel and high explosive shells, and which resulted in very large orders for munitions coming to Canada, is well known to all Nova Scotians, and has become a matter of history.
Between October, 1914, when the Scotia plants produced 22,000 shell forgings, and the signing of the Armistice, November 11, 1918, the New Glasgow plant had made more than 15,000,000 shells—these ranging in size from the 15–pounder shrapnel to 12–inch high explosive, the local plant being the only one in Canada which made the latter size. The total tonnage of forged shells produced at New Glasgow amounted in round figures to 180,000 tons. In addition to this a very considerable tonnage of shell and other munition steel was shipped to be worked up in other shell forging establishments in Canada and Great Britain. A further considerable tonnage was worked up into marine forgings. British shipyards about this time experienced great difficulty in obtaining heavy marine forgings to meet Lloyd’s specification and tests. The Scotia forges had long been on Lloyd’s list as approved makers of Marine Forgings. The British shipbuilders’ difficulty was now met by Scotia, which supplied to various yards on the Clyde, the East Coast, and other yards complete sets of marine forgings of all classes for both mercantile and other vessels of large tonnage. The total quantity of marine forgings supplied Great Britain since the outbreak of war amounted to 9,000 tons.
Most Nova Scotians are probably entirely ignorant of the considerable amount of what might be called “research” and experimental work carried out at the New Glasgow plant for the Government, and while this did not produce the tangible results brought about in connection with the manufacture of shells, not a little of the data and knowledge accumulated, contributed in a very considerable degree to the successful development of both the offensive and the defensive equipment of the Allied forces.
While this work was being done secrecy was essential, nothing was said and but little known of the work carried on along these lines. Now that the War is over the necessity for secrecy appears to be past.
In February, 1919, the firm of William Beardmore and Co., of Glasgow, Scotland, in their works magazine, told the story of the evolution and development by them of bullet-proof material for the protection of armored cars, trench shields, armor-plate for the celebrated “tanks,” and other work of a like character. The story, as told by the Beardmore people, in many important particulars runs on all fours with the experiments and results obtained at New Glasgow during the latter weeks of 1914 and the early part of 1915, when a series of exhaustive experiments were carried out at New Glasgow, first in connection with the production and testing of bullet-resisting steel plate.
This matter was first brought to the attention of the writer by General Sir Sam Hughes in connection with the shield shovel, of which a good deal was heard during 1915 and 1916. This spade, as supplied by the American makers, was formed with a sharp cutting edge, and a loophole for a rifle, but had no handle. When deliveries began to be made by the American manufacturers, a certain quantity was collected at random and turned over to the writer for testing. This was carried out at the rifle range, of the Fifth Royal Highlanders in the basement of the Bleury Street Armory, Montreal. It was then found that while practically all would stand Mark Six British Service Ammunition, they failed to withstand the much greater impact of Mark Seven Ammunition. Mark Six had a muzzle velocity of about 1,800 feet per second. Further investigation showed that the difference in bullet resisting power in the plates submitted was due to lack of uniformity.
No handles had been supplied with the shovels, and no apparent effort had been made by the manufacturers to supply one which was suitable. Scotia’s engineers were asked to meet the difficulty, which they did, and finally offered one which was adopted, weighed eight ounces, and was secured by a single rivet passing through a square slotted hole in the body of the shovel below the base of the tang.
At this time the question of supplying our army with armored machine-gun automobile trucks had become a pressing matter. The question had been turned over to a Toronto Committee. Great delay was experienced in securing sufficient suitable bullet-resisting plate, and serious confusion resulted. The experiments in connection with the shovel had thrown great doubt on the efficiency of the steel being supplied by the Americans, and again the Scotia Company were asked to carry out tests and advise as to the matter.
From hints which had filtered through from the army in France and Flanders it was known that the German Spitzer bullet was much more effective than the British new Mark Seven, and while the armor-plating contracted to be supplied by the Americans for these cars was guaranteed to withstand Mark Seven British Ammunition at 300 yards, the rumors in regard to the penetrating powers of the German Spitzer ammunition were most disquieting, and could not be ignored.