When once the Russians are firmly established on the right bank of the Danube, the Turks must necessarily retire to Shumla and the Balkan, and it is to be hoped that this will be effected before the detached corps or the flanks shall be too much compromised. The first real defence, then, that it would appear could be prudently made, would be on the Balkan passes. On the Balkan it is to be hoped that the Turkish armies would, by due arrangements, be under such great advantages of position as to enable them to make an obstinate stand.
Still, the line is long, the passes must be many, and the enemy, still numerous, would probably at length establish himself across it; but by this time, feeling the effects of the campaign and forward movement in such a country, he would find a difficulty in keeping together such large bodies, in maintaining their efficiency, and obtaining supplies for them. These difficulties would increase as he prolonged the advance.
It may be considered that at such a period a well prepared field of battle along the line of the Carasu river—from its mouth in the Lake of Bujuk Checkmedge, on the Sea of Marmora, to Kara Bournu on the Black Sea. The length of this line, from sea to sea, is twenty-four or twenty-five miles; but each flank being covered by lakes and rivers, would be easily watched and secured, and the extent of the real fighting-ground would be, by these features, reduced to nine or ten miles of plain; but with favourable undulations affording a good command over the front, and which might be improved in strength in a most powerful degree by a great development of respectable field-works. One most important advantage to be obtained from the occupation of this position would be that it covers the entire Bosphorus, and would therefore enable our fleets to remain masters of the Black Sea to the last, and preclude the enemy from the use of it.
To apply the resources of this position with effect, two ingredients must be available; first, early and energetic measures for entrenching so great an extent, so as to give it the greatest possible strength: and the other, that an adequate force should remain available for its occupation and defence. The first would require the application of several thousand workmen for several months, and could only be effected by the employment of troops, but with an understanding that a degree of benefit would be derived from their very first labours, which could be progressively improved to the very last moment. The second would require 50,000 good troops, or a proportionate increase in number of such as might be inferior.
These may appear to be heavy demands, but can scarcely be considered so, as the main and last stand to prevent the fall of an empire. The situation of the Dardanelles is detached, but presents far greater facilities for its protection, though still requiring considerable means. This is to be effected by occupying powerfully the neck of land which connects the great European Peninsula (the old Chersonese of Thrace) with the main land. At about seven miles in front of Gallipoli, and near the village of Boulaher, this neck is only three miles wide, being the narrowest part, and presents at that identical part a position that, duly fortified and garrisoned, may be given enormous strength. The whole extent of coast round the peninsula in rear of that line would be protected by the naval forces. Large means would be required to be applied to the preparation of this position within a short time; 4000 workmen would do it in three months, and a garrison of 12,000 good troops would be necessary for its defence if properly attached.
The use of this position however, would not be solely confined to securing the retreat of the fleet, but would be very threatening for offensive measures also; it would cover a very extensive district, within which might be rapidly collected by sea any force that it might be thought advisable at any time to advance, either to the front or flank of the invader, with a comparatively short communication and secure depôts and retreats. It is, in fact, the point that would form the best line of operations for any forces acting in alliance with Turkey, excepting those which would be applied to the immediate protection of Constantinople; although the water communication would be open to the Gulf of Enos, and perhaps up the Maritza, the depôts, hospitals, reserves, &c., should be established on this peninsula.
To return to the consideration of the defences for Constantinople. A second line has been designed round the city, at only a mile or two in advance; the ground is extremely favourable. It would cover the whole space from the Sea of Marmora to the Bosphorus and, well entrenched, would be capable of considerable resistance, but it has several defects. 1. It can hardly be deemed sufficiently extensive and influential for the last resort of a great army. 2. It would be too near to the city, and the proceedings and feelings of the forces would be greatly influenced by the tumults, panics, insurrections, treacheries, and confusion of the place; so much so, that no vigorous defence could be expected from it. 3. It would be considered as a last hold, and merely as a point for surrender. 4. It would not cover the whole of the Bosphorus, and consequently it would necessitate the evacuation of the Black Sea by our fleet.
On these accounts I attach no value to it, provided the Carasu frontier be taken up. If the disposable force was only from 5000 to 12,000 strong, I would recommend its services being exclusively engaged to secure the Dardanelles, an additional force of 25,000 might form a valuable nucleus for the preparation and defence of the frontier of the Carasu. If a larger army could be collected it would join and act in conjunction with the Turkish forces in the Balkan, for which purpose their best landing-place would be the Gulf of Enos, proceeding to Adrianople up the Maritza river; or they might act elsewhere, according to the circumstances of the times. An idea is suggested that the Russians, on the understanding of the preparation by the allies, may content themselves with remaining in quiet possession of the Principalities, and thus gain an absolute advantage. It is not for me, taking in view military operations only, to judge of the effect of such a course, further than to give an opinion that I am not aware of any military measures that it would be desirable to attempt to drive them out without the co-operation of Austria.
The question is rather political than military, but it would appear to me that by so doing they would certainly abandon their cause for war, and would suffer more in prestige than they would gain in substance.