Origins of the 'Forty-five

by Unknown

Daniel on joining the Jacobite army had been befriended by the Duke of Perth, and naturally he heartily disapproved of Lord George Murray. His dislike and distrust are shown frequently in his narrative. He tells, too, how his chief, Lord Balmerino, quarrelled with Lord George; how the hardships the cavalry endured in the campaign nearly drove the men to mutiny, the blame being thrown on the general. Such unreasoning accusations must have made Lord George’s life, hard as it was, more difficult than it would have been had officers and men been really disciplined.

There is another charge which Daniel makes against Lord George Murray—a charge which raised much controversy amongst the Jacobites—namely, the responsibility for fighting the battle of Culloden.

Daniel says: ‘Contrary to the Prince’s inclination, Lord George Murray insisted on standing and fighting that day. The Prince, notwithstanding his great inclination to avoid fighting, was at last obliged to give way to the importunity of Lord George Murray, who even used terms very cutting in case of refusal.’ This attempt to fix the responsibility on Lord George is contrary to impartial evidence, as may be seen by careful examination of contemporary documents.[76] Lord George was against fighting, his scheme being to retire to the mountains, very much as proposed by the Marquis D’Eguilles. The Prince surely must have known this, yet we find that while hiding in South Uist he told Neil Maceachain that ‘he blamed always my Lord George as being the only instrument in loseing the battle, and altho’ that he, the morning before the action, used all his rhetorick, and eloquence against fighting, yet my Lord George outreasoned him, till at last he yielded for fear to raise a dissension among the army, all which he attributed to his infidelity, roguery, and treachery.’ One can only surmise that in his anger against Lord George Murray, the Prince’s recollection of what had actually happened had become confused, and, surrounded by flatterers even in his flight, he had brought himself to lay the responsibility on his Lieutenant-General.

The controversy, which long raged among the Jacobites, may be set at rest once and for all from the report of the Marquis D’Eguilles to Louis XV. D’Eguilles was the accredited envoy of the King of France to the itinerant Court of Prince Charles Edward. On his return to France after a year’s confinement as a prisoner of war, he wrote an official report of his mission to the French king. It is a State document, preserved in the archives of the French Government, but apparently it has never been examined by any British historian. From the text of that document, an extract from which is here given, it will be seen that on the Prince, and the Prince alone, lay the responsibility of fighting the battle of Culloden.

French Envoy’s Official Report to Louis XV. on the Battle of Culloden

Le prince, qui se croyait invincible, parce qu’il n’avait pas encore été vaincu, défié par des ennemis qu’il méprisait trop, voyant à leur tête le fils du concurrent de son père, fier et haut comme il l’était, mal conseillé, peut-être trahi, oubliant en ce moment tout autre projet, ne put se résoudre à lui refuser un seul jour le combat. Je lui demandai un quart d’heure d’audience en particulier. Là, je me jetai en vain à ses pieds; je lui représentai en vain qu’il lui manquait encore la moitié de son armée, que la plupart de ceux qui étaient revenus n’avaient plus de boucliers, espèce d’armes défensives, sans les quelles ils ne sauraient combattre avec avantage; qu’ils étaient tous épuisés de fatigue, par une longue course faite la nuit précédente; que depuis deux jours plusieurs n’avaient pas mangé, faute de pain; qu’il fallait se réduire à défendre Inverness; qu’il serait même encore plus prudent de l’abandonner et de mettre entre les ennemis et nous la rivière, auprès de laquelle cette ville est batie; qu’au pis-aller nous entrerions dans les montagnes voisines; que c’était là qu’il serait véritablement invincible; que nous y resterions les maîtres de la partie de la côte où devait arriver le secours d’armes et d’argent que nous attendions; que dès que nous l’aurions reçu, nous marcherions vers l’Angleterre par cette même côte, ainsi qu’il avait été convenu; que plus les ennemis se seraient avancés vers nous, et plus il leur serait difficile en rebroussant chemin, d’arriver à Londres avant nous; que c’était la prise de cette grande ville qui devait faire son unique objet; que les succès qu’il pourrait avoir ailleurs n’auraient jamais rien de décisif, tandis que tout allait être perdu sans ressource dans une heure, s’il venait à être battu.

Enfin, le trouvant inébranlable dans la résolution prise de combattre à quelque prix que ce fût, je fis céder mon penchant à mon devoir. Je le quittai pour la première fois, je me retirai en hâte à Inverness, pour y brûler tous mes papiers, et y songer aux moyens de conserver à votre Majesté la partie de ses troupes qui ne périrait dans l’action.

Je vis avant la fin du jour le spectacle le plus frappant de la faiblesse humaine: le prince fut vaincu en un instant. Jamais déroute plus entière que la sienne.

TRANSLATION

The Prince who believed himself invincible because he had not yet been beaten, defied by enemies whom he thoroughly despised, seeing at their head the son of the rival of his father; proud and haughty as he was, badly advised, perhaps betrayed, forgetting at this moment every other object, could not bring himself to decline battle even for a single day. I requested a quarter of an hour’s private audience. There I threw myself in vain at his feet. In vain I represented to him that he was still without half his army; that the great part of those who had returned had no longer targets—a kind of defensive armour without which they were unable to fight with advantage; that they were all worn out with fatigue by a long march made on the previous night, and for two days many of them had not eaten at all for want of bread; that it was necessary to fall back to defend Inverness; that it would be even more prudent to abandon that town, and to place between the enemy and ourselves the river near which this town is built; that if the worst came to the worst, we might betake ourselves to the neighbouring mountains—there it was that he would be truly invincible; there we would remain masters of that part of the coast, at which supplies of arms and of money ought to be arriving, and as soon as these reached us, we should march towards England by that same coast as had already been arranged; that the more the enemy should advance towards us, the greater would be their difficulty to retrace their steps so as to get to London before us; the capture of that great city should be made his one object, for successes that he might achieve elsewhere would have no decisive value, while, in a single hour, all would be lost without hope of recovery if he should chance to be beaten.