Each member of this truly popular assembly will be chosen by about six thousand electors, by the poor as well as the rich. No decayed or venal borough will have an unjust share in their determinations—no old Sarum will send thither a representative by the voice of a single elector.[35] As we shall have no royal ministers to purchase votes, so we shall have no votes for sale; for the suffrages of six thousand enlightened and independent freemen are above all price. When the increasing population of the country shall render the body too [13] large at the rate of one member for every thirty thousand persons, they will be returned at the greater rate of one for every forty or fifty thousand, which will render the electors still more incorruptible. For this regulation is only designed to prevent a smaller number than thirty thousand from having a representative. Thus we see a provision follows, that no state shall have less than one member, for if a new and greater number than thirty thousand should hereafter be fixed on, which should exceed the whole of the inhabitants of any state, such state, without this wholesome provision, would lose its voice in the House of Representatives—a circumstance which the constitution renders impossible.
The people of England, whose House of commons is filled with military and civil officers and pensioners, say their liberties would be perfectly secured by triennial Parliaments. With us no placeman can sit among the representatives of the people, and two years are the constitutional term of their existence. Here, again, lest wealth, powerful connections, or even the unwariness of the people should place in this important trust an undeserving, unqualified or inexperienced youth, the wisdom of the Convention has proposed an absolute incapacity till the age of twenty-five. At twenty-one a young man is made the guardian of his own interest, but he cannot, for a few years more be intrusted with the affairs of the nation. He must be an inhabitant of the state that elects him, that he may be intimately acquainted with their particular circumstances—The house of Representatives is not, as the senate, to have a President chosen for them from without their body, but are to elect their speaker from their own number—They will also appoint all their other officers. In great state cases, they will be the grand inquest of the nation, for they possess the sole and uncontroulable power of impeachment. They are neither to wait the call, nor abide the prorogations and dissolutions [14] of a perverse or ambitious Prince, for they are to meet at least once in every year, and to sit on adjournments to be agreed on between themselves and the other servants of the people. Should they differ in opinion, the President, who is a temporary fellow-servant, and not their hereditary master, has a mediatorial power to adjust it for them, but cannot prevent their constitutional meeting within the year. They can compel the attendance of their members, that their public duty may not be evaded in times of difficulty or danger—The vote of each representative can be always known, as well as the proceedings of the house, that so the people may be acquainted with the conduct of those in whom they repose so important a trust. As was observed of the Senators, they cannot make new offices for themselves, nor increase, for their own benefit, the emoluments of old ones, by which the people will be exempted from needless additions to the public expences, on such sordid and mercenary principles—They are not to be restrained from the firm and plain language, which becomes the independent representatives of freedom, for there is to be a perfect liberty of speech. Without their consent, no monies can be obtained, no armies raised, no navies provided. They, alone, can originate bills for drawing forth the revenues of the union, and they will have a negative upon every legislative act of the other house.—So far, in short, as the sphere of fœderal jurisdiction extends, they will be controulable only by the people, and, in contentions with the other branch, so far as they shall be right, they must ever finally prevail.
Such, my Countrymen, are some of the cautionary provisions of the frame of government your faithful convention have submitted to your consideration—such the foundations of peace, liberty and safety, which have been laid by their unwearied labors—They have guarded you against all servants but those “whom choice and common good ordain,” against all masters, “save preserving Heaven.”
[15] NUMBER IV.
The security for national safety and happiness, resulting from other parts of the fœderal Government.
In considering the respective powers of the President, the Senate and the House of Representatives, under the fœderal constitution, we have seen a part of the wholesome precautions, which are contained in the new system. Let us examine what further securities for the safety and happiness of the people are contained in the general stipulations and provisions.
The United States guarantee to every state in the union a separate republican form of government. From thence it follows, that any man or body of men, however rich or powerful, who shall make an alteration in the form of government of any state, whereby the powers thereof shall be attempted to be taken out of the hands of the people at large, will stand guilty of high treason; or should a foreign power seduce or over-awe the people of any state, so as to cause them to vest in the families of any ambitious citizens or foreigners the powers of hereditary governors, whether as Kings or Nobles, that such investment of powers would be void in itself, and every person attempting to execute them would also be guilty of treason.
No religious test is ever to be required of any officer or servant of the United States. The people may employ any wise or good citizen in the execution of the various duties of the government. In Italy, Spain, and Portugal, no protestant can hold a public trust. In England every Presbyterian, and other person not of their established church, is incapable of holding an office. No such impious deprivation of the rights of men can take place under the new fœderal constitution. The convention [16] has the honour of proposing the first public act, by which any nation has ever divested itself of a power, every exercise of which is a trespass on the Majesty of Heaven.
No qualification in monied or landed property is required by the proposed plan; nor does it admit any preference from the preposterous distinctions of birth and rank. The office of the President, a Senator, and a Representative, and every other place of power or profit, are therefore open to the whole body of the people. Any wise, informed and upright man, be his property what it may, can exercise the trusts and powers of the state, provided he possesses the moral, religious and political virtues which are necessary to secure the confidence of his fellow citizens.