And yet this is not the only grievous point of weakness. After a war shall be inevitable, the requisitions of congress for quotas of men or money, will again prove unproductive and fallacious. Two causes will always conspire to this baneful consequence.
1. No government can be stable, which hangs on human inclination alone, unbiased by the coercion; and 2, from the very connection between States bound to proportionate contributions, jealousies and suspicions naturally arise, which at least chill the ardor, if they do not excite the murmurs of the whole. I do not forget indeed, that by one sudden impulse our part of the American continent has been thrown into a military posture, and that in the earlier annals of the war, our armies marched to the field on the mere recommendations of congress. But ought we to argue from a contest, thus signalized by the magnitude of its stake, that as often as a flame shall be hereafter kindled, the same enthusiasm will fill our legions, or renew them, as they may be filled by losses?
If not, where shall we find protection? Impressions, like those, which prevent a compliance with requisitions of regular forces, will deprive the American republic of the services of militia. But let us suppose that they are attainable, and acknowledge as I always shall, that they are the natural support of a free government. When it is remembered, that in their absence agriculture must languish; that they are not habituated to military exposures and the rigour of military discipline, and that the necessity of holding in readiness successive detachments, carries the expense far beyond that of enlistments—This resource ought to be adopted with caution.
As strongly too, am I persuaded, that the requisitions for money will not be more cordially received. For besides the distrust, which would prevail with respect to them also; besides the opinion, entertained by each state of its own liberality and unsatisfied demands against the United States, there is another consideration not less worth of attention—the first rule for determining each quota of the value of all lands granted or surveyed, and of the buildings and improvements thereon. It is no longer doubted that an equitable, uniform mode of estimating that value is impracticable; and therefore twelve States have substituted the number of inhabitants under certain limitations, as the standard according to which money is to be furnished. But under the subsisting articles of the union, the assent of the thirteenth State is necessary, and has not yet been given. This does of itself lessen the hope of procuring a revenue for federal uses; and the miscarriage of the impost almost rivets our despondency.
Amidst these disappointments, it would afford some consolation, if when rebellion shall threaten any State, an ultimate asylum could be found under the wing of congress. But it is at least equivocal whether they can intrude forces into a State, rent asunder by civil discord, even with the purest solicitude for our federal welfare, and on the most urgent entreaties of the State itself. Nay the very allowance of this power would be pageantry alone, from the want of money and men.
To these defects of congressional power, the history of man has subjoined others not less alarming. I earnestly pray that the recollection of common sufferings, which terminated in common glory, may check the sallies of violence, and perpetuate mutual friendship between the States. But I cannot presume, that we are superior to those unsocial passions, which under like circumstances have infested more ancient nations. I cannot presume, that through all time, in the daily mixture of American citizens with each other, in the conflicts for commercial advantages, in the discontents which the neighborhood of territory has been seen to engender in other quarters of the globe, and in the efforts of faction and intrigue—thirteen distinct communities under no effective superintending control, (as the United States confessedly now are, notwithstanding the bold terms of the confederation) will avoid a hatred to each other deep and deadly.
In the prosecution of this enquiry, we shall find the general prosperity to decline under a system thus unnerved. No sooner is the merchant prepared for foreign ports, with the treasures which this new world kindly offers to his acceptance, than it is announced to him, that they are shut against American shipping, or opened under oppressive regulations. He urges congress to a counter-policy, and is answered only by a condolence on the general misfortune. He is immediately struck with the conviction, that until exclusion shall be opposed to exclusion, and restriction to restriction, the American flag will be disgraced. For who can conceive, that thirteen legislatures, viewing commerce under different regulations, and fancying themselves discharged from every obligation to concede the smallest of their commercial advantages for the benefit of the whole, will be wrought into a concert of action and defiance of every prejudice? Nor is this all: Let the great improvements be recounted, which have enriched and illustrated Europe: Let it be noted, how few those are, which will be absolutely denied to the United States, comprehending within their boundaries, the choicest blessings of climate, soil and navigable waters; then let the most sanguine patriot banish, if he can, the mortifying belief that all these must sleep, until they shall be roused by the vigor of a national government.
I have not exemplified the preceding remarks by minute details; because they are evidently fortified by truth, and the consciousness of the United States of America. I shall, therefore, no longer deplore the unfitness of the confederation to secure our peace; but proceed with a truly unaffected distrust of my own opinions to examine what order of powers the government of the United States ought to enjoy? How they ought to be defended against encroachments? Whether they can be interwoven in the confederation, without an alteration of its very essence, or must be lodged in new hands? Showing, at the same time, the convulsions which seem to await us, from a dissolution of the union or partial confederacies.
To mark the kind and degree of authority which ought to be confided to the government of the United States, is no more than to reverse the description which I have already given, of the defects of the confederation.
From thence it will follow, that the operations of peace and war will be clogged without regular advances of money, and that these will be slow indeed, if dependent on supplication alone. For what better name do requisitions deserve, which may be evaded or opposed without the fear of coercion? But although coercion is an indispensable ingredient, it ought not to be directed against a State, as a State; it being impossible to attempt it except by blockading the trade of the delinquent, or carrying war into its bowels. Even if these violent schemes were eligible, in other respects, both of them might, perhaps, be defeated by the scantiness of the public chest; would be tardy in their complete effect, as the expense of the land and naval equipments must be first reimbursed; and might drive the proscribed State into the desperate resolve of inviting foreign alliances. Against each of them lie separate unconquerable objections. A blockade is not equally applicable to all the States, they being differently circumstanced in commerce and in ports; nay an excommunication from the privilege of the union would be vain, because every regulation or prohibition may be easily eluded under the rights of American citizenship, or of foreign nations. But how shall we speak of the intrusion of troops? Shall we arm citizens against citizens, and habituate them to shed kindred blood? Shall we risk the inflicting of wounds which will generate a rancour never to be subdued? Would there be no room to fear, that an army accustomed to fight for the establishment of authority, would salute an emperor of their own? Let us not bring these things into jeopardy. Let us rather substitute the same process by which individuals are compelled to contribute to the government of their own States. Instead of making requisitions to the legislatures, it would appear more proper that taxes should be imposed by the federal head, under due modifications and guards; that the collectors should demand from the citizens their respective quotas, and be supported as in the collection of ordinary taxes.