On the other hand, the government exercised a quiet but real control over the whole German coal industry. Through its ownership of the Koenigen Louise mines it acted as a member of the Upper Silesian coal syndicate. Formerly, through its ownership of the Saar mines, it was also a member of the Westphalian coal syndicate, but whether a member or not it practically approved the syndicate operations and the fixing of prices in advance; also, it co-operated with the syndicate in hauling the latter’s coal over state-owned railway systems. In certain undeveloped coal fields in Germany, the northern extension of the Westphalian field, the Prussian government retains most of the coal rights.
The Rhenish Westphalian coal syndicate is a classic example of a great interlocking trade combination. Capitalized at $571,000, it covered an enormous capitalization of individual members. The mines have votes in proportion to production, which in turn is limited for certain periods. Prices are fixed and coal is marketed for the syndicate as a unit, but other affairs are left to the companies. The syndicate as a whole is a member of a transporting and exporting combine, and disposes of its product through a combine of coal dealers. The several minor combines interlock and are practically merged in a larger organization, the Kohlen Kontor. Thus the combination had exceptional power to study the various problems of the industry, and became very powerful. It maintains a research department and an explosion testing gallery near Dortmund. In several countries German companies through the control of advertising contracts have been able to influence the editorial policy of the leading newspapers, even during the war. Over half of the German coal mined before and during the war was syndicate coal. All of the 600 other German cartels have not been as moderate in their action and regulations as the coal syndicate. When the coal syndicate, however, at one time, found it could not supply its German market with coal, it is reported to have bought inferior British coal for its customers, so that they would not themselves get good British coal and refuse to return to the German supply.
Efforts were made by the cartel to absorb and control foreign coal trade, where political and financial reasons served to render this advisable, and therefore these efforts were out of all proportion to the intrinsic value of the trade. When it was planned to capture such a trade, the German-invented “dumping” system was used, coal being sold cheaper abroad than it could be sold or produced at home, the difference being met by export bonuses. This German dumping became so serious in some countries, as Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, that special import duties were imposed to counteract it. When desirable, the syndicate purchased collieries abroad, including even a South Yorkshire plant in England, the Heraclea collieries, in Turkey, and many mines in Australia.
In Great Britain is a powerful coal combine, the Cambria, closely allied with great shipping concerns. An important trade asset in this organization, like that in the German cartel, is a banking connection by which the combine can offer long-term credit.
Coal syndicates are mentioned in Belgium. Some sort of central organization interested in coal is known in Italy, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Sweden, Greece, Argentina, Chile, and Ecuador.
THE SITUATION IN FRANCE, ENGLAND, AND THE UNITED STATES
France has a modified form of ownership of coal resources: this was vested formerly in the Crown and now in the Republic. The government gives concessions for mining the mineral and charges a royalty. The mineral is not considered to be owned by the surface owner or by the original surface owner, as is the case in all other important countries. The concessions granted are liberal and for large areas. The royalty or rental is small and is now paid on the basis of so much per superficial unit of area (hectare) in the concession, but the chief returns received by the public are through a percentage of the net earnings, that is, earnings available for dividends. Under the conditions prevailing in France the system seems eminently fair, and the undertakings have been profitable both to the operators and to the country. The books of the company are open to inspection by government officials, and the annual reports are published in detail. The system virtually makes the government a partner in the business.
In Great Britain most of the coal ownership is vested in entailed estates, and the royalties are a shilling a ton and upwards.
Both private and government ownership exist in the United States. Throughout the greater part of the country the large operating companies own the coal rights, although in the anthracite district of Pennsylvania the fortunate owners of the surface, or their assigns, receive large royalties, 25 to 50 cents a ton. In the Middle West most of the operators have bought the coal rights from the surface owners. When leased, the royalty is relatively small, 2 to 6¹⁄₄ cents a ton. Operators in the Rocky Mountains generally own the coal they mine. The government has sold the coal rights, but the state school lands of Colorado and Wyoming have generally been leased at royalties of about 10 cents a ton. In Oklahoma the Five Civilized Tribes have until recently, under government control, leased their lands and coal rights at about 10 cents per ton, but these rights are now being sold.
In the State of Washington a considerable amount of the bituminous coal district now opened is owned by the Northern Pacific Railway, which secured these lands as grants when the railroad was constructed. The royalty is about 15 to 25 cents a ton.