Roused by the nightmare of war in 1914, even the United States awoke to the perils if not to the real needs of the domestic situation. It is a striking and highly significant fact that despite the fundamental importance of nitrogen, the awakening found us absolutely without any formulated program of action, even military or agricultural, let alone anything of comprehensive economic scope. A hysterical effort at improvising a program ensued. We were not yet in the war, and public interest was just roused to the gullible stage. The opportunity for private pickings from public favors was too promising to go by the board. The only prospect opening up lay in the direction of fixation developments, and fixation in the hands of the promoter is one of the most appealing propositions imaginable. Its major requirements are nitrogen and power. With the former inexhaustibly present in the air and the latter inexhaustibly available in the wasting waterpowers of the country, nothing it would seem, could offer greater promise. Add to this the reflection that cheap nitrogen means cheap fertilizer, and cheap fertilizer means lowered cost of foodstuffs, and the proposition broadcasted over the country is complete. Out of the confusion of interests, public, political, and private, a program was finally evolved, following our entry into the war, calling for the erection of a series of fixation plants with an aggregate producing capacity of around 85,000 tons of fixed nitrogen annually. For the present is must suffice to say that the war ended before any of these had reached the producing stage, and the United States, like Great Britain, depended on imports.

The charts comprising [Figure 16] show the influence of the war in the development of nitrogen distributively among the countries concerned. The Scandinavian developments, while actuated from wholly commercial motives, were so largely influenced by the politically stimulated market that they may well enough be included in that general class of politically controlled developments. The same is true for the neutral countries in general. [Figure 18], based on the best information obtainable, is designed to bring out the collective influence of the war in contributing to the world’s supply. Organic nitrogen is disregarded both because it involves too many uncertainties and because the wartime emphasis was all in the direction of chemical nitrogen. This figure takes into consideration only the actual production and leaves out what was in process of construction when the war ended. Accordingly, while in one respect it overrates the effect of the war by including strictly commercial operations that very possibly might have transpired anyway, in another it underrates the situation by disregarding developments like those in this country. The best that can be done is to consider these as balancing each other, which, all things considered, is probably fair enough for all practical purposes. Taken on this basis, the net effect of the war, it will be observed, was to swell the production of fixed nitrogen some 40 or 50 per cent. above the figures indicated for the normal rate of expansion.

Thus the wartime shortage was made up; but all this is history. Now that the war is over, the question arises as to whether the world is due to face the situation in reverse. In making ready for war, and finally in meeting its demands, has the world been building up a 50 per cent. over-production beyond the needs of peace? Offhand, the answer would seem to be in the affirmative, but the question is not one that can be answered offhand. Agriculture is capable of absorbing an indefinite amount of nitrogen, and the war has wrought a lasting change in the agricultural situation. The changed agricultural conditions make room for much, perhaps for all, of the increment to nitrogen production. The development cannot be sustained, however, on its present arbitrary preferential basis of political expediency. Least of all can it be sustained on that basis in this country. Normally, we do not and can not be made to think in terms of war. The reason is evident enough, and its recurrent force is already apparent. Distasteful as the fact may be in some of its extremes of application, the only rational procedure is to accept it and fashion our measures of economic preparedness so that the normal activities of peace will keep our economic forces exercised and in trim for the test of war. It was recognized all along before the war that without an assured source of nitrogen supply, our system of defense was hollow; but we succeeded in building up no means of supply in direct response to political needs. We managed to get comfortably started during the war, but it remains to be seen to what extent this artificially nourished development is fitted to withstand the bitter strife of competition ahead.

COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF NITROGEN CONTROL

Free nitrogen, it will be recalled, has no economic significance. To be available in the industrial arts it must be in a state of chemical combination. The form of compound is of secondary importance, since this may be modified more or less readily to suit the need, but its value is conditioned in terms of its availability in the form of nitrogen compounds. In consequence, the several sources are classifiable industrially under three heads:

Natural compounds—nitrogen occurring naturally in the form of marketable compounds.

By-product compounds—nitrogen rendered available incidentally in the course of operations otherwise directed.

Fixation compounds—nitrogen whose availability is dependent on special fixation treatment.

Natural Compounds.

—Chile nitrate is the outstanding representative of the natural compounds. The guano industry, or what there is left of it, and a few other odds and ends of production from organic sources, belong here as well, but their combined output is so relatively small that the Chilean industry comprises what amounts to a monopoly of the natural resources. It is not operated as such, however, but by private capital, which owns and operates the oficinas, paying the Chilean government a royalty or export tax amounting to about $11.20 per ton. British and Chilean interests share about equally in making up the far greater part of the capital invested. The balance is largely German and American. The total capitalization in 1909 amounted to approximately $134,000,000, representing an actual valuation of about $30,000,000. Various efforts on the part of the commercial interests involved to effect combinations for the purpose of stabilizing production have been attempted, but have not been entirely successful, and the general tendency has all along been toward overproduction.