Wide and more wide th’ o’erflowings of the mind,
Take every creature in of every kind.”
In Hierocles, however, the circles are scientifically detailed; but in Pope they are synoptically enumerated. Pope, too, has added another circle to that which is the outermost with Hierocles, viz. the circle which embraces every creature of every kind. But as Hierocles in this fragment is only speaking of our duties to kindred, among which the whole human race is, in a certain respect, included, he had no occasion to introduce another circle, though the Platonic doctrine of benevolence is as widely extended as that of Pope.
As the selflove, however, mentioned here by our poet is of a virtuous nature, and is wholly different from that selflove which is reprehensible, and is possessed by the vulgar, I shall present the reader with what Aristotle says concerning the former in the 9th book of his Nicomachean Ethics, as the distinction between the two is at present but little known.
Aristotle, therefore, having observed, that the selflove of the multitude leads them to distribute to themselves the greater part in wealth and honours, and corporeal pleasures, and that in consequence of vindicating to themselves more of these things than is fit, they are subservient to desires and passions, and the irrational part of the soul, adds as follows:
“He who always earnestly endeavours to act justly or temperately, or to act according to any other of the virtues, the most of all things, and, in short, who always vindicates to himself that which is beautiful in conduct; such a man will never be called by any one a lover of himself, nor will he be blamed by any one. It would seem, however, that such a man as this is, in a greater degree, a lover of himself; for he distributes to himself things which are most eminently beautiful and good, is gratified in his most principal part [intellect], and in all things is obedient to it. But as that which is the most principal thing in a city appears to be most eminently the city, and this is the case in every other system of things; thus, also, that which is most principal in man is especially the man. He, therefore, who loves this principal part of himself, is especially a lover of himself, and is gratified with this. That every man, therefore, is principally intellect, and that the worthy man principally loves this is not immanifest. Hence, he will be especially a lover of himself, according to a different species of selflove from that which is disgraceful, and differing as much from it as to live according to reason differs from living according to passion, and as much as the desire of that which is beautiful in conduct differs from the desire of that which appears to be advantageous. Hence it is necessary that a good man should be a lover of himself; for he himself is benefited by acting well, and he also benefits others. But it is not proper that a depraved man should be a lover of himself; for he will hurt both himself and his neighbours, in consequence of being subservient to base passions. With the depraved man, therefore, there is a dissonance between what he ought to do and what he does; but with the worthy man, those things which he ought to do he also does.”
Conformably to what Aristotle asserts in this last sentence, Seneca also says, “Sapiens nihil facit quod non debet, et nihil prætermittit quod debet.” i.e. “The wise man does nothing which he ought not to do, and omits nothing which he ought to do.”
[52] There is a deficiency here in the original, which I have endeavoured to supply in the translation by the words in the brackets. It appears to me, therefore, that the words χρησθαι καλως are wanting.
[53] For ενστασεως, in this place in the original, I read επιστασεως.
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