[Note 15], [p. 94].—The orator in this connection then proceeds to give at some length his reasons for attempting negotiations in 1796–97. These, as having no direct bearing on the subject discussed, are omitted.
[Note 16], [p. 113].—For an explanation of what was done at Mantua, see [Note 3], [p. 31]. On the Declaration of Pilnitz, see [Note 9], [p. 42].
[Note 17], [p. 116].—See notes [4] and [5] above.
[Note 18], [p. 119].—Reference is here made to the Treaty of September 26, 1786. Mr. Fox argued this question at greater length in a letter to his Westminster constituents. Pitt maintained that England in 1800 was not bound by that treaty inasmuch as the French Government which had made the treaty had been destroyed by the Revolution. In reply Fox declared that if the Revolution had swept away the obligation to obey that treaty, it must have also swept away the obligation to obey all others. But Pitt had often acknowledged the binding force of obligations entered into before the Revolution. Hence the treaty of 1786 was still in force; and according to it the dismissal of M. Chauvelin was equivalent to a declaration of war.
[Note 19], [p. 121].—When the Duke of Brunswick invaded France in July of 1792 at the head of the Austrian and Prussian forces he published a manifesto which did every thing possible to put his masters in the wrong. The burden of the proclamation was that the French had usurped the reins of administration in France, had disturbed order, and had overturned the legitimate government. He declared that the allied armies were advancing “to put an end to anarchy in France, to arrest the attacks made on the altar and the throne, and to restore to the king the security and liberty he was deprived of.” The manifesto furthermore said that the “inhabitants of towns who dared to stand on the defensive would instantly be punished as rebels with the rigors of war, and their houses demolished and burned.” This proclamation not only showed that the principal object of the war was an interference with the domestic policy of France, but it greatly inflamed the animosities of the French against the foreign powers. See Mignet, “Fr. Rev.,” 143; v. Sybel, ii., 29.
[Note 20], [p. 128].—It is an interesting fact that in the early part of 1792 Louis XVI. sent to the King of England, through Chauvelin and Talleyrand, asking the English Government to intercede to prevent military action on the part of Austria and Prussia. Louis appears to have seen that war on the part of the German powers, though intended to restore Louis himself to his former influence and authority, could only result in evil. Louis said: “I consider the success of the alliance, in which I wish you to concur with as much zeal as I do, as of the highest importance; I consider it as necessary to the stability of the respective constitutions of our two kingdoms; and I will add that our union ought to command peace to Europe.” The proposal was rejected, and a few weeks later Louis made a second attempt. He now asked the King to interpose, and by his wisdom and influence, “avert, while there is yet time, the progress of the confederacy formed against France, and which threatens the peace, the liberties, and the happiness of Europe.” This proposition, too, was rejected July 8, 1792, and before the end of the month France was invaded by the allied armies under Brunswick.
[Note 21], [p. 134].—General Suwarroff, one of the most extraordinary men of his time, had begun his career in the days of Frederick the Great, and had contributed much to the fame of the Russians for bravery at the terrible battle of Kunnersdorf. Though now nearly seventy years of age he showed an energy that made his name a terror wherever he went. The campaign against Praga is described in Alison, 10th ed., iii., 517 seq. For his far more remarkable campaign in Italy, see vol. v., 45 seq.
[Note 22], [p. 142].—The allusion here is to the Treaty of Campo Formio, signed Oct. 17, 1797, by which a large part of the Venetian territory was turned over to Austria in consideration of the annexation of Belgium and Lombardy to France. The machinations by which this transaction was brought about were among the most perfidious in the whole career of Napoleon. In regard to the alleged reason of giving up Venice Napoleon wrote to the Directory: “I have purposely devised this sort of rupture, in case you may wish to obtain five or six millions from Venice.” See Lanfrey’s “History of Napoleon,” 1, 100; and Adams’ “Democracy and Monarchy in France,” 162.
[Note 23], [p. 143].—The Emperor Paul I., father of Alexander I. and of Nicholas, was probably already insane at the time Fox was speaking. He had long shown a meddlesome disposition, and had interfered with the internal concerns of nearly all the countries on the Baltic as well as with those of Spain. Pitt on a former occasion had said of him: “There is no reason, no ground, to fear that this magnanimous prince will ever desert a cause in which he is so sincerely engaged.” But in spite of this prediction he did desert the allies and make peace with France. In view of these facts Fox’s ironical use of the word “magnanimous” was a peculiarly forcible hit.
[Note 24], [p. 151].—In this conjecture Fox was not far from the language subsequently used by Napoleon. He said: “I then had need of war; a treaty of peace which should have derogated from that of Campo Formio, and annulled the creations of Italy, would have withered every imagination.” He then went on to say that Pitt’s answer was what he desired, that “it could not have been more favorable,” and that “with such impassioned antagonists he would have no difficulty in reaching the highest destinies.”—“Memoirs,” i., 33.