[Note 56], [p. 260].—This subject is well presented in McCarthy’s chap. lix., “Reformation in a Flood.” For a list of the most important of these measures, see the Introduction to Mr. Gladstone.
[Note 57], [p. 263].—The “Captain” was a six-gun turret-ship, which, with a crew of five hundred men, foundered at sea on the 7th of September, 1870. The court of enquiry found that the disaster was owing to faulty construction of the vessel, which had been built “in deference to public opinion, as expressed in Parliament and through other channels, and in opposition to the views and opinions of the Controller of the Navy.”—“Ann. Reg. for 1870,” 107, 119. The “Megara” was an iron screw troop-ship that was run aground in a sinking state at St. Paul’s, Ireland, June 19, 1871. The commissioners of enquiry into the causes of the disaster reported their “decided opinion that the state and condition of the ‘Megara’ was such that she ought never to have been selected for the voyage.” After giving the details that led to their conclusion, the commissioners said: “It is with reluctance and pain that we express unfavorable opinions with respect to the conduct of officers and the management of a great department.”—“Ann. Reg. for 1881,” 96, and for 1882, 257, 260.
[Note 58], [p. 263].—This had been suggested by Mr. Lowe, the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
[Note 59], [p. 266].—Mr. Cobden was of the same opinion. In 1854 he said: “I look back with regret on the vote which changed Lord Derby’s government; I regret the result of that motion, for it has cost the country a hundred millions of treasure and between thirty and forty thousand good lives.”—Morley’s “Life of Cobden,” Eng. ed., ii., 151.
[Note 60], [p. 267].—During the Civil War Mr. Gladstone as well as Lord Russell had inclined to favor the Southern cause by a recognition of the Southern States. To this Mr. Disraeli and Lord Stanley (the present Lord Derby) were strenuously opposed. During Mr. Disraeli’s first administration Lord Stanley was Secretary of State for Foreign affairs.
[Note 61], [p. 268].—This statement is not quite justified by the facts. At the conclusion of the Civil War, intense feeling of indignation pervaded the United States against Great Britain, for three reasons: first, for a premature recognition of the belligerency of the Southern States; secondly, for the direct aid and supplies furnished the Southern States in British ports; and thirdly, for allowing the fitting out of cruisers in British ports to prey upon Northern commerce. The people of the United States held that Great Britain through her government had disregarded the obligations of neutrality imposed upon her by the law of nations. The United States Government remonstrated with the British Government, demanding reparation for past wrong, and cessation from a continuance of the wrong. But so long as Lord John Russell was in power (through whose negligence or misjudgment the wrong had been done) no progress was made toward a settlement. The Derby-Disraeli government succeeded that of Russell in 1866, with Lord Stanley as Minister of Foreign Affairs. About the end of 1866 Lord Stanley, through Sir Frederick Bruce, offered to submit the Alabama Claims to arbitration. To this Mr. Seward assented “on condition that the whole controversy between the two governments should be deferred.” Lord Stanley asked for information as to what was meant by the expression “the whole controversy,” but the answer was not free from ambiguity, and was supposed to refer to damages for “premature recognition of the Confederacy.” As Lord Stanley had refused to submit this subject to arbitration, negotiations were broken off. The matter rested till March 6, 1868, when it was brought up in the House of Commons, and was fully debated. This was followed by a debate March 20th in the House of Lords, both in excellent spirit. It was in the following November that negotiations were again opened with a view to submitting the differences to arbitration. A preliminary agreement was reached and signed November 10th, by Lord Stanley and Mr. Johnson, the American minister. It was not, however, acceptable to Mr. Seward, who telegraphed November 26th: “Claims Convention unless amended is useless.” In a long despatch of the same date sent by mail the objections were duly pointed out, the most important of which were in regard to Article IV. of the Protocol, and were stated in these words: “While the Convention provides that the United States claims and the British claims shall be settled and determined by a majority of the Commissioners, this Article IV. requires entire unanimity of the Commissioners for a derision upon any of the Alabama Claims.” Other objections were given, but this was the most important one why, as Mr. Seward said, “the United States are obliged to disallow this Article IV.” On November 28th Mr. Johnson had an interview with Lord Stanley, when the latter said he had received a despatch from the British minister at Washington, which stated “that it was understood that all the cabinet disapprove of it.” On the 5th of December Mr. Johnson wrote to Mr. Seward that he just had an interview with Lord Stanley, who “expressed no willingness to change the mode of appointing the arbitrator who is to decide the question of the liability of this government for the Alabama Claims.” In the same letter Mr. Johnson announced the resignation of the Disraeli government, and the necessity of postponing all further negotiations. On the whole subject see “Diplomatic Correspondence,” 3d Sess., 40th Cong., vol. i., pp. 361–391. Soon after the Gladstone-Clarendon government came into power the subject was again taken up, and a Protocol was agreed upon between Mr. Johnson and Lord Clarendon, providing that “all claims should be submitted to arbitration.” This treaty was submitted to the Senate of the United States, and April 19, 1869, was rejected with but one dissenting voice. The grounds of objection were that the Alabama Claims were so obscured by minor matters that they would not receive due attention. The Johnson-Clarendon treaty is given in the “Diplomatic Correspondence” and in “Ann. Reg. for 1869,” p. 282. The subject was not again renewed till the outbreak of the Franco-German War, in regard to which see [note 63].
[Note 62], [p. 270].—At the conclusion of the Crimean War the great powers in the Treaty of Paris agreed to impose and enforce the neutrality of the Black Sea. The waters and the ports were “perpetually interdicted to the flag of war of either of the powers possessing its coasts,” excepting certain small armed vessels to act as a sort of maritime police. As was not unnatural, Russia chafed under this interdiction. The Franco-German War broke out in July of 1870. In October of that year, when France and Germany were so occupied as scarcely to be able to protest, Prince Gortschakoff addressed a circular despatch to the European powers, stating that Russia no longer recognized the obligations of the Treaty of 1856. This despatch called forth a courteous but firm reply from Lord Granville, in which the obligatory nature of the treaty was insisted upon. It was feared that Prussia had secretly assented to the claims now put forward by Russia, in compensation for grants made to Prussia on the Baltic. Accordingly Mr. Odo Russell was sent to the German head-quarters at Versailles to ascertain the attitude of the Prussian Government. Count Bismarck assured the English ambassador that Prussia had given no sanction to the step, and proposed that the whole question should be submitted to a conference of the powers, to be held at London. This proposal of Prussia was assented to by England and Russia, and the conference took place in January of 1871. The result was the neutralization of the Black Sea was abrogated. The prediction of Beaconsfield, that “the entire command of the Black Sea will soon be in the possession of Russia,” has been amply justified by subsequent history.—“Ann. Reg., 1870,” 109; 1871, 3–17.
[Note 63], [p. 271].—The Washington Treaty of June 17, 1871, provided for referring five important questions in dispute to a Committee of Arbitration, consisting of one member appointed by the Queen of England, one by the President of the United States, one by the King of Italy, one by the President of the Swiss Confederation, and one by the Emperor of Brazil. The sixth article of the treaty provided that the Arbitrators should be guided in their decision of the “Alabama Claims” by “three rules” which were given in the article, and which virtually acknowledged the responsibility of England for allowing the “Alabama” to be fitted up in a British port, and allowing her to escape. The adoption of these “three rules” unquestionably gave the United States great advantage and made, it nearly certain that the case would be adjudicated in their favor. But the opposition in England steadily held that the “three rules” that were made the basis of the arbitration were not justified by the requirements of international law. This view has since been held by many prominent publicists, American as well as European. The rules are of at least questionable advantage, and have not been assented to by any other powers than England and the United States. The result of the arbitration, which was held at Geneva in 1871 and 1872, was to award “the sum of $15,500,000 in gold as the indemnity to be paid by Great Britain to the United States for the satisfaction of all claims referred to the consideration of the tribunal.” The treaty and the award are printed at length in Cushing’s “Treaty of Washington,” pp. 257–280. What made England willing to adopt the “three rules” for the sake of speedily reaching a final settlement, was the condition of affairs in Europe. In case England had become involved in war, her commerce would have been at the mercy of American privateers. But the treaty and the award were very unpopular in England. Mr. McCarthy (iv., 347) says: “What most of the English people saw was that England had been compelled, in homely phrase, to ‘knuckle down’ to America.” This unpopularity of the measure and the good use made of it by Lord Beaconsfield had not a little to do with bringing on the downfall of Gladstone’s government.
[Note 64], [p. 272].—Reference is here made to the so-called “indirect claims” which the United States Government insisted on having considered by the Arbitrators, but which the English as strenuously refused to submit. The claim was in substance that the “Alabama” and other cruisers had not only directly destroyed much of our commerce, but had indirectly prolonged the war, and that for this prolongation the United States should be paid. Though this doctrine was presented in the so-called “American Case,” which, as Beaconsfield amusingly says, was translated into all languages and sent into all European courts, it was not formally objected to until the Arbitrators met at Geneva. The question there seemed likely to bring arbitration abruptly to an end. But finally the Arbitrators, in an informal manner, declared that “in case the indirect claims should come before them, they should be obliged to reject them,” whereupon the Americans said that all they insisted on was a decision, not necessarily a decision in their favor. The difficult question thus happily disposed of, other matters were settled with substantial unanimity.
[Note 65], [p. 275].—It is not difficult to understand the great influence of passages like this in stirring the national feeling of Great Britain. Lord Beaconsfield knew how to move the British heart as no other modern statesman except Palmerston has done.