These things being so, the speaker concludes: “I am justified in denying that the policy which we pursued in Italy was that of exciting revolutions, and then abandoning the victims we had deluded. On the contrary, I maintain that we gave advice calculated to prevent revolutions, by reconciling opposite parties and conflicting views. Ours was a policy of improvement and peace; and therefore the Government deserves not condemnation, but praise.”

Note 22, p. [214].—The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, so called from the palace in which it was signed (July, 1833), by Russia and Turkey, was in many respects an epoch-making document. Its influence was long felt in the world-forces that thrill with every new agitation of the Eastern Question. The causes that led to its signing were the revolt and highly successful campaigns waged against the Sultan by Mehemet Ali, Viceroy of Egypt, and his son Ibrahim. After the fall of Acre, Ibrahim overcame the Turkish army sent against him in Syria, advanced to the north, overcame another army, and had the way clear for a march to the Bosphorus, when the terrified Sultan called in the aid of Russia. At his request a Russian squadron came to Constantinople. It is needless to say that this event was highly unwelcome both to England and France. France threatened to recall her ambassador, Admiral Roussin; but the Sultan only appealed to Russia for troops and more ships. Finally, through the agency of France, a peace was patched up between the Sultan and his Egyptian enemies. Although really relieved of his fears by France, it was to Russia that the Sultan showed the fullest gratitude. The outcome of this was the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which arranged for nothing less than a defensive Russo-Turkish alliance. As for Russia, she had not only signed a treaty, but executed a coup of the most important nature. For, by a secret clause, which was soon made public, Turkey agreed to close the Dardanelles to the warships of the world when Russia was at war. And, by the very nature of the clause, Russia, in such a predicament, could use Turkish waters as her own. The gates of the Dardanelles were to be unlocked for her; for all others they continued closed. The Russian advantage is obvious. From this moment the English distrust of Russia increased daily; and England and France were single in their aim to diminish Russian influence with the Porte. And the feeling thus aroused had for its eventual outlet the Crimean War. But at first French indignation found expression in a marked display of friendly feeling towards the old rebel, Mehemet Ali. The Sultan had died; but against his successor the Egyptian now took up arms again. Some signal victories having been gained by him, the French and English fleets appeared in the Dardanelles, chiefly as a menace against Russia. The latter saw that she would have to abdicate from her singularly advantageous standpoint as the sole protector of Turkey. When negotiations were opened again between the new Sultan and Mehemet, the rebel refused to conclude a peace upon reasonable terms; but France was the only power that remained favorable to his pretensions. Thus, in the settlement of this matter, France and England were brought into decided opposition: the former proposing that to Mehemet and descendants all Syria and Egypt should be given, a yearly tribute to be paid to the Porte; the latter insisting that Mehemet should have Egypt alone, that he should evacuate Northern Syria, and that he should hold Palestine only as life-governor. Lord Palmerston not only held firm to this, but persuaded the other Powers to acquiesce in it. Accordingly, on July 15, 1840, a treaty was signed by the consenting Powers. France, thus left out in the cold, worked herself into a jealous frenzy, which, however, did not lead her into actual hostilities. The Allies now proceeded calmly to crush the bone over which all the dogs of war had been snarling. With expedition Ibrahim was expelled from Syria; and Mehemet, at Alexandria, was compelled to compound with Sir Charles Napier, the English Admiral, by formally submitting to the Sultan; by accepting merely the hereditary possession of Egypt; and by restoring to the Sultan the Turkish fleet, which, by the double-dealing of its captain, had gone over to him. To this arrangement France at last decided to yield. And now, about the crux of the Dardanelles, a modus vivendi was arrived at. Russia could not hope to retain the predominant privileges conferred at Unkiar Skelessi. Along with France, she joined in the general understanding of the Powers that no warship of any nation should be allowed to pass these mooted straits—save and only if Turkey were at war. Thus she had to give up her hope of sea-power in the Mediterranean; but at the same time her Euxine shores were safe from all but Turkish attack. And so the flags of Europe to-day float off Constantinople only from the so-called “guardships,” the small gunboats which each Power may maintain there as the moral emblem of its fleet.

The direct reference made to Turkish questions in this speech, delivered as events were gathering for the Crimean War, is to the incident of the Hungarian refugees. Following the insurrection in Hungary headed by Kossuth and others, the leaders had fled (1849) to Turkey. Kossuth himself was among these refugees; and his children were taken care of at the British embassy. Austria and Russia directly demanded of the Porte that it should give the refugees up. Strange to say, the Sultan, in a new rôle for an Ottoman Emperor, refused. The public opinion of Western Europe rallied to a position of the Porte so sympathetic, and, as recounted in the text, fleets, English and French, were ordered to the Dardanelles. With these Powers behind the Sultan, there was only one thing for the two Emperors to do: they withdrew their demand. Thus closed another incident in that problem of problems, the Eastern Question.

Note 23, p. [233].—The “committing” of a Bill followed its second reading. The House constituted itself as a Committee to consider the details of a Bill: the Speaker temporarily abandoned the Chair to another member; and the Bill was then discussed clause by clause. The House failing to agree on any point, a Division, or poll of the members, was taken. The majority vote decided. Mr. Sheldon Amos (“Primer of the English Constitution and Government,” London, 1877, p. 46) conveniently summarizes the Parliamentary history of a successful Bill:

“1. Motion for leave to bring in the Bill. Order to bring it in.

“2. Motion to have Bill read a first time. Order that it be read a first time.

“3. Motion to have Bill read a second time. Order that it be read a second time.

“4. Motion to have the Bill committed. Order that it be committed.

“5. Committee on details of Bill. Report of Committee.

“6. Motion that Bill be read a third time. Motion that it be passed. Passing of a Bill and sending of it to House of Lords.”