2. The value of charity records as a basis for determining the kind and amount of relief that should be given in an emergency cannot be over-emphasized. The case records of the Associated Charities, of the several benevolent societies of the different nationalities, and of the Catholics and the Hebrews, and the records of the almshouse, all should have afforded a quick means of learning the former dependent or independent position of many applicants. Unfortunately in San Francisco, before the fire, most of these agencies did not sufficiently understand the value of permanent detailed records. The result was that a number of people who previously had been more or less dependent were assisted on the assumption that they were as likely to become self-supporting as those who had never applied for aid. Elderly indigents rarely resort to an alias and they might have been easily identified if the records had been reasonably complete and had been available in one central bureau. Since the disaster, the exchange of case information among the principal charitable agencies is proving invaluable in preventing duplication of relief and in developing unity of plans for constructive charity.
3. The value of trained investigators is distinctly apparent in a comparison of their recommendations with those of amateurs in the Ingleside cases. The inexperienced visitor, “taken in” by some plausible old person, would recommend a grant of several hundred dollars; the committee, mindful of many applicants yet to come and suspicious of the excessive enthusiasm of the visitor, would give half as much carefully guarded. The trained visitor, on the other hand, seized upon the hopeful points as well as the limitations of capacity and formed a balanced judgment which the committee usually accepted in substance and which was generally justified by the subsequent history of the applicant. The business of an investigator is not to harden his sympathies and expose imposture, but to become a trained and sympathetic expert in human nature. Especially in emergency relief, therefore, his judgment should be of the highest value.
4. The pension and the direct grant were both used in providing for two quite different classes of the aged and infirm. A number of feeble persons who had been decent and hardworking before the fire but who, very evidently, could never again be self-supporting, were given grants outright “till they should be able to work again”—as the committee kindly phrased it—or because they were “too nice to go to the almshouse.” A larger number of cases, where it was impossible to determine whether the applicants were still capable of self-support or in need of institutional care, were given the benefit of the doubt. This was, indeed, almost compulsory because institutional facilities were so meager. The intention of these grants must be wholly commended, but the history of the cases treated by the two methods indicates clearly that the money given in instalments in care of a visitor or of the Associated Charities had been much more effectively spent than that given to the applicant in a lump sum. If it be assumed—as it should be—that no decent person of this borderland class should be prematurely relegated to an institution, the results in San Francisco prove that a limited pension in the care of a friendly visitor is both wise and humane. It is, moreover, economical.
5. The age of possible rehabilitation is approximately defined by the results of these cases. The natural period of self-support is between sixteen and sixty; but the capacity of the unskilled laboring classes to keep the pace of modern industry often begins to decline at middle age. As regards health and ability to be self-supporting the decade between fifty and sixty is critical; and the number of those between sixty and seventy who, after such a disruption of their lives as that produced by the earthquake and fire, are able to re-establish themselves even with assistance, will be very small. To conserve the common self-respect and society’s humane instincts, as many as possible should be encouraged to try.
6. The lack of provision for certain classes in San Francisco was well known to charity workers before the fire, but it became a far more serious matter owing to the sudden increase and shifting of these classes of dependents. There were many people set down as “convalescents” at Ingleside who remained permanently in need of institutional care. The hospitals continued to discharge, at the earliest possible moment because of overcrowding, numbers of half-well people who had no homes and little or no resources. Even those who went back to poor homes frequently did not recover fully for want of proper care during the convalescent period. Those without homes must go to the Relief Home, and the increase of this class of inmates became a serious tax on the institution. The medical attention that must be given to the inmates of the Relief Home is greater than had to be given in the old almshouse. The increase in the number of the incurables, due in some measure to the shock and hardships of 1906, makes great demands upon the nursing staff. Although the number of admissions per thousand of the population is now no greater than before the disaster, the permanent burden of refugees will remain proportionately great for some years to come. Certain special classes—the convalescent, the incurable, the advanced tubercular, the chronic alcoholic, have never been adequately provided for in San Francisco. The transition from emergency to permanent provision affords the opportunity for developing the best methods and differentiating the kinds of charitable care.
SOME LESSONS
OF THE RELIEF SURVEY
SOME LESSONS OF THE SURVEY