What is the remedy? It cannot be too plainly stated that there must be only one relief committee or corporation.[95] There must be no division of responsibility for distribution. If there must be reform it must be within the relief corporation itself. If one of the eastern committees in command of large funds had set up its own agency in San Francisco, it would have been guilty of improper trusteeship. That much is evident. The suggestion has been made that the committees in charge of the larger funds should each have had a representative on the Finance Committee. Mr. Bicknell, for instance, came first to San Francisco as the representative of the Chicago Commercial Association and the Mayor’s committee funds. But such representation would not include the smaller fund committees. A more inclusive plan is desirable. The gradual strengthening of the American National Red Cross seems to point the way. The Red Cross should become so fully recognized as the national agency for all disaster funds that it should eventually, in any given case, receive all funds not sent directly to a local committee. Its relation to local committees will be strengthened and it can be relied upon to suggest and whenever necessary push changes in relief measures. In San Francisco and each subsequent disaster of any proportions, the American National Red Cross has been represented by its expert agents. Its strength has been materially increased by the appointment of a permanent director. The withholding of funds once subscribed for a particular disaster should become an impossibility as the status of the national agent is recognized.
[95] See Sixth Annual Report American National Red Cross, 1910, p. 156. See also section on The Incorporation of the Funds, [Part I], [p. 25] ff. of this volume.
We have alluded to one form of restriction, that of requiring that a specified fund be used for a specified form of rehabilitation. Such restriction must of course be accepted after an effort has been made, and has failed, to persuade the forwarding committee to lift the restriction. But restrictions upon relief in kind are doubly dangerous and ill-advised. In the San Francisco disaster the “flour” episode gives an apt illustration. Certain forms of food were donated in quantities in excess of the needs. These were flour, potatoes, and condensed milk, all three of them valuable forms of food in an emergency. The potatoes, as it was the end of the season, did not keep well in large masses and the refugees, living in tents or in basements or attics, had little room for storage. Besides, the universal practice in San Francisco and the vicinity where fresh vegetables can be bought the year round, is to buy in small quantities from day to day or week to week and not store in the fall for winter use. The Finance Committee, unable to dispose of the potatoes to refugees, decided to sell the surplus stock. The sale does not appear to have been made, perhaps because they were unsaleable. At any rate large quantities spoiled and had to be thrown away.
It was natural to think that condensed and evaporated milk would be necessities of prime importance. They were valuable, but on account of local conditions were not needed in great quantities. The supply of milk from the ranches outside the city was not much diminished by the earthquake. By confiscation and by arrangement with dealers an abundant supply of fresh milk was secured for distribution to the refugees.
Many committees throughout the country sent flour as the most useful form of food. It came so fast that for lack of warehouses in which to store it (practically all city warehouses having been burned) part of it was put aboard three transports and in the army warehouses, and finally a vast quantity was stacked up in the open air. The transports were not adapted to preserving flour in good condition so they could not long be used as storehouses. The Finance Committee, confronted by the problem of finding storage for the vast supply received, and knowing that it was several times as much as could be reasonably distributed, decided on May 17 to sell 4,000,000 pounds. This was vigorously objected to by the Minneapolis committee which had sent 15 per cent of the 16,000,000 pounds received. It insisted that its flour should be distributed,—the very flour sent, not flour purchased later with cash from the sale of Minneapolis flour. This episode led to newspaper publicity and protests. The lesson is, that restrictions upon relief in kind are unsatisfactory and embarrassing and should always be placed upon a discretionary basis. The Minneapolis committee claimed that title to its flour had been transferred to the destitute of San Francisco, not to the Red Cross or to the Finance Committee, who were apparently to be considered solely as the servants of distribution. The position is an impossible one in which to place a self-respecting committee.
Many donors of money gave specific directions as to the use to which they wished it put. There was the man who sent $1.00 with a request to hand it to some worthy sufferer and let him report to the donor; and there was the refugee who, after he had found employment elsewhere, sent a small sum, more than enough to pay for the three days’ rations he had received in the bread line, with the request that the balance be given to a soldier who had been kind to him. Jewelers sent money for jewelers, artists for artists, teachers for teachers, physicians for physicians, the people of one town for their fellow townsmen in San Francisco.
Money was also sent to individuals connected with the relief funds to be applied to specific purposes. Fortunately, there were enough unrestricted funds available to assist all classes and carry out the intent of all donors. It was not necessary to open a special account for each of these trusts.
No actual restriction as to the purpose of expenditure, imposed either by donors directly or by the custodians of large funds, was in itself onerous to the relief authorities, but the circumstances attendant upon the remittance of restricted funds caused more or less embarrassment during nearly the whole period of the relief work.