The slavery question, Mr. Botha tells us, was handled with astounding negligence and ignorance of the circumstances of the people. Although England was perfectly right in emancipating the slaves, yet the way it was done irritated, annoyed, and disgusted the people, and sowed seeds of distrust which have never been eradicated. England failed to carry out effectively her promises of compensation.
On the minor grievances, such as Slagter’s Nek and other so-called injustices of England, Mr. Botha lays no stress. “It was a rough period, and rough measures were used by all Governments.” He significantly adds that what he has heard of the cruelty of the Dutch East India Company’s officials makes him think that anyhow British rule was heaven to that of the Dutch. Whatever a well-educated man like Mr. Botha may say, we know that the rank and file of the Dutch throughout South Africa are taught to “Remember Slagter’s Nek.” Nothing can be more unjust than to blame the British power for executing rebels, caught red-handed and sentenced to death in perfect accord with both evidence and law by a competent Court, whose members were themselves of Dutch extraction. Nevertheless this is one of the heavy popular grievances.
Mr. Botha says that England’s weak and spasmodic policy in South Africa has made the Boer what he is to-day—distrustful and contemptuous of British statesmen. By further receding into the interior, and having to fight wild beasts and hordes of Kaffirs, the Boer became blown out with vanity at his own prowess, and more and more ignorant. Through this ignorance it is easier to mislead than to lead him. A man who plays upon his vanity and prejudices against England quickly obtains influence. A loud talker and blusterer gets a better hearing than a quiet reasoner. “I ascribe this to want of education and complete isolation on the veldt.”
As a marked illustration in support of Mr. Botha’s view which has come under the present writer’s observation, let us tell what occurred shortly before the war to a nephew of the Speaker of the House of Assembly who had to travel through the Transvaal to look after some landed property. This gentleman, who spoke the Taal perfectly, met at one place about two dozen Dutchmen who were, like the Laird of Cockpen, “greatly ta’en up with the ’fairs of the State.” The first question, “Can we beat the British?” was answered by a unanimous “Yes, we have done so before, and can, of course, easily do so again.” Second. “Tell me, Carls, could we beat England and France united?” “Certainly,” said every one, “there can be no doubt about it.” But now interposed a new speaker. “How if we had to fight England, France, and Germany?” The reply was unanimous. “We can beat them all three.” No wonder that the people of the Lord, as they believed themselves to be, took the bit between their teeth at the time of the ultimatum. Not even Paul Kruger could then have stopped the war, for they felt perfectly assured of victory.
With a religion which has not unfitly been described as a superstition based upon the Old Testament, there is profound ignorance accompanied by prejudice of the most deep-rooted character. Mr. Botha tells us that unfortunately the ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church, “greedy for the fat lamb, the fowl, and the purse,” foster this ignorance. One Predikant had actually the audacity to tell his congregation that God must help His chosen people, otherwise He would lose His influence.
Mr. Botha defends his own people against charges of treachery, and gives it as his fixed opinion that a just and firm Government with uniformity of treatment will not only control and satisfy the Boers, but eradicate in time that feeling of distrust and fear which was engendered in their minds by the halting and unequal policy of England. He admits at the same time that it is to Britain that they owe peace, and that it was Britain that protected them from foreign invasion and saved them from continual civil strife. Then comes most important evidence. President Brand of the Free State recognised in the misgoverned Transvaal a subtle enemy. Indeed, it is scarcely remembered that in 1857 the burghers of the South African Republic invaded the Orange Free State territory and declared that it belonged to them. Paul Kruger was subsequently raised up, in the opinion of his followers, to be a Moses, whose mission was to deliver “De Africander Natie” from British bondage. Mr. Botha asks us to let him tear this veil of false romance away. “We know him,” he tells us, “as an avaricious, unscrupulous, and hypocritical man, who sacrificed a whole people to his cupidity.” Krugerism spread over South Africa, using the Bond, the press, and the pulpit to further its schemes.
AT THE HEAD OF UMGENI FALLS, HOWICK, NATAL.
Let it be fully understood—the Bond was the fons and origo of the South African war—Krugerism powerfully co-operating. The idea of the Africander Bond took root at the Paarl in the Cape Colony in the years 1879 and 1880. Of course, as we have seen, there was abundant preparation, but events in the Transvaal hastened proceedings. Enthusiastic, educated men, such as Reitz, Te Water, and the students of the Theological Seminary at Stellenbosch felt patriotic desires wildly coursing in their veins, but the honour of formulating a definite plan of organisation belongs to the Rev. S. J. du Toit, who then edited De Patriot newspaper at the Paarl. De Transvaalse Oorlag was published by Messrs. D. T. du Toit & Co. of the Paarl in the year 1881. It was the retrocession of the Transvaal under the direction of Mr. Gladstone in the last-mentioned year that enabled the Bond to assume a very definite shape, and to obtain immense and widespread power.