MAJOR-GENERAL CLARENCE R. EDWARDS.
Commanding the 26th Division.
The Allies’ Counter-Offensive of July 18.
It has been seen that, from the end of June to July 15, the French, by a series of local operations, had secured excellent positions of attack, by clearing the Villers-Cotterets Wood and re-occupying the eastern bank of the Savières. Moreover, the crisis due to the shortage of men had been overcome. In a prodigious effort Great Britain had re-constituted her armies; from eight to ten thousand American soldiers had been landing daily in France since March; the victory on the Piave enabled the Allies to retain a number of excellent Italian divisions in France, so that Marshal Foch was at last in a position to assume the initiative of manœuvre and offensive which until then had been impossible.
The French armies, representing 80 per cent. of the Allied forces engaged in the battle, were as high-mettled as ever, the enemy’s push having been powerless either to wear them down or to break their spirit. They were, moreover, fully equipped with up-to-date armament, including large numbers of the all-important tank, by now a supreme weapon of attack. Their use on a large scale in support of the infantry counter-balanced the effect of the enemy’s asphyxiating gas and storm battalions.
Signs of apprehension began to manifest themselves in the enemy camp, where several commanders of divisions on the Ourcq front in vain called attention to the precursory signs of the coming big attack. The German High Command, repeating Von Klück’s blunder of 1914 with regard to General Maunoury’s Army, misjudged the Allies’ strength and, so far from re-inforcing this sector, withdrew a number of reserve divisions in favour of the Marne and Champagne fronts.
On July 12, Foch ordered a counter-attack to be made on the western flank of the Château-Thierry salient. Leaving to General Gouraud in Champagne, and to General Berthelot between the Marne and Rheims, the heavy task of holding up the enemy “peace offensive,” Pétain organised the concentration of the armies of Generals Mangin and Degoutte, which were placed under the orders of General Fayolle. Thus, at the time the Germans were concentrating towards the eastern flank of the salient, the Allies were executing a similar manœuvre in the direction of the western flank. These two moves explain the whole battle, for while every enemy move was being closely observed and the bare minimum of troops used to hold up their attack, the Allies’ powerful concentration in the Villers-Cotterets Woods entirely escaped the enemy’s notice.
This admirably camouflaged concentration was completed in three nights. To make the surprise still more effective, it was decided to attack without artillery preparation, it being left to the tanks to make good the deficiency.