Forty-two divisions under Generals von Boehn (7th Army) and Von Below (1st Army) were concentrated between Pontoise and Berry-au-Bac and between Berry-au-Bac and Rheims. In the centre, where their principal effort was to be made, the Germans massed twenty-eight divisions of picked storm-troops trained in the new methods of attack. Of these twenty-eight divisions twenty-three previously formed part of General Von Hutier’s famous “Army of Attack” which, in March, had broken through the front of the Fifth British Army on the Somme. Since the middle of April, all the picked divisions, except two, had been sent to the rear and intensively trained in view of the coming attack. All the first-line divisions, fifteen in number, knew the ground of the sector of attack, having fought there in 1917. The objective of some of them was the same as in the Battle of the Chemin-des-Dames in 1917.



THE OPPOSING FORCES DURING THE GERMAN ATTACK OF MAY 27, 1918.

From June 5, five more divisions were engaged, making a total of forty-seven divisions, or the equivalent of about sixty French divisions (German regiments having three more companies than French regiments, and divisions one more regiment). The enemy order of battle between the Oise and Rheims on May 27, extended along three zones of attack—a central zone, from Leuilly to Berry-au-Bac, which was the principal sector of attack, and two secondary zones on the wings—between Pontoise and Leuilly to the west and between Berry-au-Bac and Rheims to the east.

The plan of attack was similar to that adopted in the Battle of the Somme. Each division had two regiments in the first line and one in reserve. Each leading regiment had two battalions side by side in deep echelon formation, with one supporting battalion. Battalions of storm-troops, liquid-fire companies, independent detachments of machine-gunners, companies of cyclists and mountain battalions were added to each division.

Each regiment was provided with numerous heavy and light machine-guns, mine-throwers, and accompanying guns. An idea of the huge numbers of the latter may be gained from the fact that sixty-eight batteries of four guns each were counted in two regiments.

The infantry attack was prepared and supported by a formidable concentration of guns of all calibres. The artillery of the 7th German Army on the Leuilly—Berry-au-Bac front was estimated at 1,450 batteries—i.e. fifty batteries per mile, of which twenty supported the infantry. This artillery concentration greatly exceeded that of the preceding German offensives of 1917 and 1918.