On the northwest corner of Egypt is the Gulf of Solum, an indentation of the Mediterranean. A reinforced garrison of Egyptian troops officered by Englishmen is quietly camping there to see that in the excitement of the Italian-Turkish war the eastern boundary of Tripoli shows no sign of advance beyond a certain point. West of that boundary-line two non-resident African landlords are at war for the possession of Tripoli without consulting the wishes of the one million inhabitants of the land, or the millions of their fellow-Mohammedans to the south, west, and east. Turkey was the landlord in possession, Italy the aggressor. The bird in hand this time was loosely held, and will probably be lost to its erstwhile captor; but the bill of damages, only a small instalment of which has yet been paid, to be assessed against the invader will be heavy and the subsequent retention expensive, unsatisfactory, and unremunerative.
To the onlooker the prize does not seem to be worth the price. Setting aside all high-flown expressions such as “control of the Mediterranean” and the like with which the Italian politicians keep up the spirits of the people at home and justify the conduct of the war, expressions which mean nothing, owing to their lack of foundation in truth, the test as to the wisdom of the conquest of Tripoli narrows down to the value of the land itself as a colonial possession.
Tripoli contains over 400,000 square miles of territory on which live about one million people, a population of two and a half to the mile. Most of these people, however, live on a narrow strip along the 1100 miles of coast-line, and the rest find abiding-places in scattered groups among the oases of the desert. As a matter of fact, the entire population of the country lives upon 19,000 square miles, or about one twentieth of the territory of Tripoli. Along the coast, on which there are no very good harbors, with the possible exception of Tobruk, is the low plain of Jefara, about forty miles wide. To the south of this rises the Jebel range of hills, and still farther south extends a plateau over 40,000 square miles in extent, absolutely barren, rocky, and uninhabited. This reaches to Hammada-el-Homra. To the south of Hammada lies the land of Fezzan, a collection of oases in a vast region of sand-dunes and desert. To the eastward lies Tobruk, whose people trade with Egypt. Still on toward the Sahara is Murzuk, formerly the great caravan station between the Mediterranean and Lake Chad, but now, since the trade of this part of the world has been diverted from the north to the mouth of the Kongo, the northern terminal of the great caravan route. Only three European travelers have visited Murzuk in the last twenty years. The green banner of the prophet flies throughout this country, and the brotherhood of the Senussiya is bound together in anti-foreign tenets. Its headquarters are at Kufrah, in the Libyan Desert, and it sends a mission of its own to the sultan at Constantinople, so independent of the government of Tripoli does it regard itself.
There are legends as to the richness and prosperity of Tripoli in the time of the Roman occupation, but that this prosperity has been grossly exaggerated is now well known. The sand-dunes have been creeping over the coastal plain of Jefara until they have reared their dreaded crests within sight of the city of Tripoli. The sultan’s nominal authority has extended even to the Tuaregs, near Ghat, but with the advent of Europeans in the Niger Valley and Hausa Land, the southern portion of Tripolitania, might as well be across the Sahara Desert, so far as the northern coast is concerned. And Tripoli is no longer the gateway to the Sudan or to black Africa. The trade that formerly flowed north and south now goes to Egypt on the east or to Algeria on the west, or, in some instances, to the west coast of Africa.
For the last ten years this quiet but effectual disintegration of commercial Tripoli has been going on until there is little left for the new landlord even should he succeed in establishing his rule and secure acknowledgment thereof. There are no mineral resources, no possibilities in agriculture, and the desolation of the vast, unfertile, rainless area daunts the most intrepid adventure. The problems of centralized government are many and apparently impossible of solution, certainly by the Italians, who know naught of colonial science. To the north the city of Tripoli, with its 50,000 population, is an inharmonious community of Jews, Berbers, Arabs, Maltese, and Levantines, with probably fewer than two hundred genuine Italians among them. Hundreds of miles to the south, separated by rock and desert now seldom traveled, are the Tuaregs, where the women own all property and take plural husbands much for the same economic and social reasons that the Turk has several wives.
Naturally the exports of a country like Tripoli are of the most primitive character, exporting grass, hides, fruit, and a few other things that are found wild or are grown in limited quantities. Her imports are food-stuffs, cotton, and woolen goods, fuel, iron, and steel. Of the exports, half a million dollars’ worth find their way to the United States, and in return a few thousand dollars’ worth of cloths and other manufactures are sold. Of the total foreign commerce, amounting to less than five million dollars, the United States participates to only a fractional per cent., and there is little hope of improvement in the future. English merchants do the largest part of the trading, with France second, Italy third, and Turkey fourth, and both exports and imports hold in about the same proportion as to destination and origin.
It is a relief to cross the Tripolitan border into Tunis and Algeria, the French possessions. Here everything has been done by an intelligent landlord to develop the country and encourage the industry of the people. With an area only half again as large as Tripoli, and even so the larger part desert, a population seven times as great finds a living and occupation. A foreign commerce of 225 million dollars nearly equally divided between export and import slightly exceeds even that of Egypt, and the exchanges of the United States, although a comparatively small trader, amount to nearly two million dollars’ worth of goods. The administration of Algeria and Tunis has cost France many millions of francs, but the task has been well done. In return, however, the people of France have benefited largely, for they supply over eighty per cent. of the imports of these African possessions, and take about seventy per cent. of the exports. The United States sends machinery, oils, and tobacco, and takes the raw products of the country in exchange. Trade is on a stable and safe basis, and the consuming power of the country is increasing rapidly in the direction of manufactured goods and the conveniences of civilized life.
It requires a certain form of genius and a certain temperament to be a successful landlord, and this is even more requisite when governing a far-distant community of foreign people. These qualities have been demonstrated by the French in their control of northern Africa, and, it may be added, to the surprise of the rest of the civilized world, for in their government at home the French people have not shown equal genius or been as successful as they have in Africa. To allow the exercise of autocratic power is perhaps the best way to utilize the virtues of the French temperament.
In general the African continent is in good hands, English, French, and German alike. The natives, as a rule, get justice; their religions and their customs are respected, and they are benefited materially, socially, and even politically as dependencies. In the days of a recent British agent in Egypt who believed in a larger degree of local government than had been allowed by his predecessor, some confusion resulted and things got rather out of hand. Proof was promptly given in the trouble that quickly arose that this was a mistake. When Lord Kitchener arrived on the scene he had many loose ends to pick up and weak spots to reinforce, but he was not long in the mending. His administration has been notably successful so far, and with all the firmness with which he is credited he has also developed a tact not expected even by some of his greatest admirers. He came to Egypt at a difficult time, and to keep his Mohammedan friends neutral, which he has done, while their coreligionists are waging what they term a “holy war” against the Italians to the west of Solum Bay, is not easy. It is told of him that shortly after the beginning of the Italian-Turkish war some of the Arab chiefs of Egypt and the Sudan were keen to go to the assistance of the Tripolitans, and signified their wish to the British agent. Lord Kitchener replied that of course they could go if they wanted to, but whereas they were now free from compulsory military service in the Egyptian army, it would be impossible for him to overlook the value as soldiers of Arabs who had served in actual modern warfare, and that on their return he would have to draw upon them for military service. As this freedom from service in the Egyptian army is one of the much-prized Arab privileges and exemptions, the sheiks, recognizing the possibilities involved, promptly gave up their idea of participating in the war, and have remained neutral, at least so far as not to render assistance to Tripoli openly.
In all northern Africa no invader has attempted suddenly to change the customs of the people, and the local religions have been recognized and their tenets respected. Italy did not seem to profit by this example, for her troops have shown scant regard for the feelings of the Mohammedans, and it will take many years to live down the situation created by the violation of mosques and other injudicious and unnecessary vandalism. Northern Africa would not be what it is to-day if the same policy had been followed by others, and it is fortunate for the world at large that the Italian attack has been made upon the most worthless and most sparsely inhabited part. Less harm can be done there than elsewhere, and with the firm hand of Egypt to the east and France to the west and the physical limitations to the south, the evil effects of this ill-judged attempt at conquest may be confined within present boundaries.