At the time of the Civil War this clause was one of the provisions upon which the Court relied in holding that the Confederation formed by the seceding States could not be recognized as having any legal existence.[1544] Today, its practical significance lies in the limitations which it implies upon the power of the States to deal with matters having a bearing upon international relations. In the early case of Holmes v. Jennison,[1545] Chief Justice Taney invoked it as a reason for holding that a State had no power to deliver up a fugitive from justice to a foreign State. Recently the kindred idea that the responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations rests exclusively with the Federal Government prompted the Court to hold that, since the oil under the three mile marginal belt along the California coast might well become the subject of international dispute and since the ocean, including this three mile belt, is of vital consequence to the nation in its desire to engage in commerce and to live in peace with the world, the Federal Government has paramount rights in and power over that belt, including full dominion over the resources of the soil under the water area.[1546] In Skiriotes v. Florida,[1547] the Court, on the other hand, ruled that this clause did not disable Florida from regulating the manner in which its own citizens may engage in sponge fishing outside its territorial waters. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Hughes declared: "When its action does not conflict with federal legislation, the sovereign authority of the State over the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas is analogous to the sovereign authority of the United States over its citizens in like circumstances."[1548]
Within the sense of the Constitution, bills of credit signify a paper medium of exchange, intended to circulate between individuals; and between the Government and individuals, for the ordinary purposes of society. It is immaterial whether the quality of legal tender is imparted to such paper. Interest bearing certificates, in denominations not exceeding ten dollars, which were issued by loan offices established by the State of Missouri, and made receivable in payment of taxes or other moneys due to the State, and in payment of the fees and salaries of State officers, were held to be bills of credit whose issuance was banned by this section.[1549] The States are not forbidden, however, to issue coupons receivable for taxes,[1550] nor to execute instruments binding themselves to pay money at a future day for services rendered or money borrowed.[1551] Bills issued by State banks are not bills of credit;[1552] it is immaterial that the State is the sole stockholder of the bank,[1553] that the officers of the bank were elected by the State legislature,[1554] or that the capital of the bank was raised by the sale of State bonds.[1555]
LEGAL TENDER
Relying on this clause, which applies only to the States and not to the Federal Government,[1556] the Supreme Court has held that where the marshal of a State court received State bank notes in payment and discharge of an execution, the creditor was entitled to demand payment in gold or silver.[1557] Since, however, there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits a bank depositor from consenting when he draws a check, that payment may be made by draft, a State law which provided that checks drawn on local banks should, at the option of the bank, be payable in exchange drafts was held valid.[1558]
BILLS OF ATTAINDER
Statutes passed after the Civil War with the intent and result of excluding persons who had aided the Confederacy from following certain callings, by the device of requiring them to take an oath that they had never given such aid, were held invalid as being bills of attainder, as well as ex post facto laws.[1559]
EX POST FACTO LAWS
Scope of Provision
This clause, like the cognate restriction imposed on the Federal Government by section 9, relates only to penal and criminal legislation and not to civil laws which affect private rights adversely.[1560] It is directed only against legislative action and does not touch erroneous or inconsistent decisions by the courts.[1561] Even though a law is ex post facto and invalid as to crimes committed prior to its enactment, it is nonetheless valid as to subsequent offenses.[1562] If it mitigates the rigor of the law in force at the time the crime was committed,[1563] or if it merely penalizes the continuance of conduct which was lawfully begun before its passage, the statute is not ex post facto. Thus measures penalizing the failure of a railroad to cut drains through existing embankments,[1564] or making illegal the continued possession of intoxicating liquors which were lawfully acquired,[1565] have been held valid.