[187] Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 203, 204 (1881).
[188] Ibid. 205.
[189] Justice Frankfurter for the Court in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951). Justice Douglas dissented: "* * * I do not agree that all abuses of legislative committees are solely for the legislative body to police. We are dealing here with a right protected by the Constitution—the right of free speech. The charge * * * is that a legislative committee brought the weight of its authority down on respondent for exercising his right of free speech. Reprisal for speaking is as much an abridgment as a prior restraint. If a committee departs so far from its domain [as?] to deprive a citizen of a right protected by the Constitution, I can think of no reason why it should be immune". Ibid. 382. See also Barsky v. United States, 167 F. (2d) 241 (1948); certiorari denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
[190] Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives, I: § 493 (1907); Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives, VI: §§ 63, 64 (1936).
[191] Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives, I: §§ 496-499 (1907).
[192] 34 Stat. 948 (1907).
[193] 35 Stat. 626 (1909).
[194] The situation gave rise to the case of Ex parte Albert Levitt, Petitioner, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). This was the case in which the Court declined to pass upon the validity of Justice Black's appointment. It seems curious that the Court, in rejecting petitioner's application, did not point out that it was being asked to assume original jurisdiction contrary to the decision in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 137 (1803).
[195] I Story, Constitution, § 880.
[196] Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897).