[532] Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352 (1913).
[533] Ibid. 400-402.
[534] McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 188-189 (1940). F.D.G. Ribble's State and National Power Over Commerce (Columbia University Press, 1937) is an excellent study both of the Court's formulas and of the arbitral character of its task in this field of Constitutional Law. On the latter point, see especially Chapters X and XII. The late Chief Justice Stone took repeated occasion to stress the "balancing" and "adjusting" role of the Court when applying the commerce clause in relation to State power. See his words in South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-192 (1938); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 113-116 (1941); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362-363 (1943); and Southern Pacific v. Arizona, 325. U.S. 761, 766-770 (1945). See also Justice Black for the Court in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533, 548-549 (1944).
[535] 12 Wheat. 419 (1827).
[536] Compare, for example, May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496 (1900); and the recent case of Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945). In the latter case the benefits of the original package doctrine were extended to imports from the Philippine Islands title to which did not vest in the importer until their arrival in the United States.
[537] Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 251 (1946).
[538] Philadelphia & R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania (State Freight Tax Case), 15 Wall. 232 (1873).
[539] Headnotes. Said the Court: "The rule has been asserted with great clearness, that whenever the subjects over which a power to regulate commerce is asserted are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, they may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. Surely transportation of passengers or merchandise through a State, or from one State to another, is of this nature. It is of national importance that over that subject there should be but one regulating power, for if one State can directly tax persons or property passing through it, or tax them indirectly by levying a tax upon their transportation, every other may, and thus commercial intercourse between States remote from each other may be destroyed." 15 Wall. at 279-280, citing Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1851); Gilman. v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713 (1866); Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 42 (1868).
[540] 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
[541] Ibid. 527.