[812] Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. R.R. Comm., 283 U.S. 380 (1931).
[813] Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911).
[814] Ibid, 453, 466. See also St. Louis, I.M. & S. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 518 (1916); Missouri P.R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931).
[815] Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Brotherhood, 318 U.S. 1 (1943).
[816] 163 U.S. 299 (1896). In South Covington R. Co. v. Covington, 235 U.S. 537 (1915), the Court sustained a municipal ordinance which prohibits the company from allowing passengers to ride on the rear or front platforms without suitable barriers, and requires that the cars be kept clean and ventilated and fumigated. However, provisions of the ordinance that cars shall never be permitted to fall below a certain temperature and regulating the number of passengers to be carried in the cars were held to be unreasonable and violative of the commerce clause. There was no unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce by a municipal ordinance which directed a railway company to remove its tracks from a busy street intersection. Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Denver, 250 U.S. 241 (1919).
[817] Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U.S. 133 (1898); Richmond & A.R. Co. v. Patterson Tobacco Co., 169 U.S. 311 (1898).
[818] 325 U.S. 761, 779-780 (1945).
[819] Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 233 U.S. 75, 79 (1914).
[820] 244 U.S. 310 (1917).
[821] Cf. Southern R. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524 (1910), where the crossings were fewer and the burden to interstate commerce was shown not to be unduly heavy.