[310] 19 Stat. 78, 80.
[311] 272 U.S. 163-164.
[312] The reticence of the Constitution respecting removal left room for four possibilities, first, the one suggested by the common law doctrine of "estate in office," from which the conclusion followed that the impeachment power was the only power of removal intended by the Constitution; second, that the power of removal was an incident of the power of appointment and hence belonged, at any rate in the absence of legal or other provision to the contrary, to the appointing authority; third, that Congress could, by virtue of its power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper," etc., determine the location of the removal of power; fourth, that the President by virtue of his "executive power" and his duty "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed," possesses the power of removal over all officers of the United States except judges. In the course of the debate on the act to establish a Department of Foreign Affairs (later changed to Department of State) all of these views were put forward, with the final result that a clause was incorporated in the measure which implied, as pointed out above, that the head of the department would be removable by the President at his discretion. Contemporaneously and indeed until after the Civil War, this action by Congress, in other words "the decision of 1789," was interpreted as establishing "a practical construction of the Constitution" with respect to executive officers appointed without stated terms. However, in the dominant opinion of those best authorized to speak on the subject, the "correct interpretation" of the Constitution was that the power of removal was always an incident of the power of appointment, and that therefore in the case of officers appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate the removal power was exercisable by the President only with the advice and consent of the Senate. See Hamilton in the Federalist No. 77; 1 Kent's Comm. 310; 2 Story Comm. §§ 1539 and 1544; Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 225, 258-259 (1839). The doctrine of estate in office was countenanced by Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 137, 162-165 (1803), but has long been rejected. See Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99, 108 (1890). The three remaining views are treated by the Chief Justice, at some cost in terms of logic as well as of history, as grist to his mill.
[313] 272 U.S. at 134.
[314] Annals of Congress, cols. 635-636.
[315] 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The case is also styled Rathbun, Executor v. United States, Humphrey having, like Myers before him, died in the course of his suit for salary.
[316] 295 U.S. at. 627-629, 631-632. Justice Sutherland's statement, quoted above, that a Federal Trade Commissioner "occupies no place in the executive department" (See also to the same effect p. 630 of the opinion) was not necessary to the decision of the case, was altogether out of line with the same Justice's reasoning in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201-202 (1928), and seems later to have caused the author of it much perplexity. See Robert E. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions (Oxford University Press, 1941), 447-448. As Professor Cushman adds: "Every officer and agency created by Congress to carry laws into effect is an arm of Congress. * * * The term may be a synonym; it is not an argument." Ibid. 451.
[317] United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886).
[318] Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897).
[319] Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903).