The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation / Annotations of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 30, 1952

by Unknown

[375] 9 Stat. 102 (1846); 20 U.S.C. §§ 41 and 48.

[376] Cf. 2 Stat. 78. The provision has long since dropped out of the statute book.

[377] Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887).

[378] Cf. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 670-671 (1897), where it is held that presumptions in favor of official action "preclude collateral attack on the sentences of courts-martial." See also United States v. Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1893); and Bishop v. United States, 197 U.S. 334, 341-342 (1905); both of which in effect repudiate Runkle v. United States.

[379] "The President, in the exercise of his executive powers under the Constitution, may act through the head of the appropriate executive department. The heads of departments are his authorized assistants in the performance of his executive duties, and their official acts, promulgated in the regular course of business, are presumptively his acts." Wilcox v. Jackson ex dem McConnel, 13 Pet. 498, 513 (1839). See also, United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291 (1842); Williams v. United States, 1 How. 290, 297 (1843); United States v. Jones, 18 How. 92, 95 (1856); United States v. Clarke (Confiscation Cases), 20 Wall. 92 (1874); United States v. Farden, 99 U.S. 10 (1879); Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U.S. 755 (1880).

[380] 1 How. 290 (1843).

[381] 3 Stat. 723 (1823).

[382] 1 How. at 297-298.

[383] "It is manifestly impossible for the President to execute every duty, and every detail thereof, imposed upon him by the Congress. The courts have recognized this and have further recognized that he usually and properly acts through the several executive departments. Every reasonable presumption of validity is to be indulged with respect to the performance by the head of a department of a duty imposed upon the President and executed by the department head ostensibly in behalf of the President. Nevertheless, the authorities indicate that the President cannot, without statutory authority, delegate a discretionary duty, relieving himself of all responsibility, so that the duty when performed will not be his act but wholly the act of another. Williams v. United States, 1 How. 290, 297 (1843); Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 557 (1887); United States v. Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84, 88 (1893); French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326, 334 (1922)"; 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 457-459 (1936).

[384] 1 Annals of Congress, cols. 515-516.