[57] 12 Pet. 524 (1838).
[58] Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cr. 74, 93, 94 (1807).
[59] Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85 (1869).
[60] See also Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869).
[61] In United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 339 (1906), Justice Brewer, speaking for the Court, approached a theory of inherent equity jurisdiction when he declared: "The principles of equity exist independently of and anterior to all Congressional legislation, and the statutes are either annunciations of those principles or limitations upon their application in particular cases." It should be emphasized, however, that the Court made no suggestion that it could apply pre-existing principles of equity without jurisdiction over the subject matter. Indeed, the inference is to the contrary. In a dissenting opinion in which Justices McKenna and Van Devanter joined, in Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 475 (1917), Justice Pitney contended that article III, section 2, "had the effect of adopting equitable remedies in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States where such remedies are appropriate."
[62] Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210 (1830).
[63] 1 Stat. 333; 28 U.S.C.A. 1651.
[64] 14 Stat. 475 (1867); 26 U.S.C.A. 3653 (a).
[65] 36 Stat. 557 (1910); 28 U.S.C.A. 2281.
[66] 50 Stat. 752 (1937); 28 U.S.C.A. 2282.