[237] 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
[238] 274 U.S. 123 (1927).
[239] 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933).
[240] 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).
[241] 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201, 2202; 48 Stat. 955.
[242] 300 U.S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The Court distinguished between a justiciable controversy and a dispute of an abstract character, emphasized that the controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests, and reiterated the necessity of "a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts."
[243] Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 324-325 (1936).
[244] 303 U.S. 419, 443 (1938).
[245] Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945), citing Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299, 300 (1943); and Coffman v. Breeze Corporation, 323 U.S. 316 (1945). Here, as in other cases, the Court refused to entertain hypothetical, or contingent questions, and the decision of constitutional issues prematurely. For this same rule see also, Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 363 (1943).
[246] 306 U.S. 1 (1939).