[395] 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
[396] Ibid. 252.
[397] Ibid. 253. Citing Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222, 230 (1930).
[398] 317 U.S. 249 (1942). Cases cited as strengthening the claim were Sultan Ry. & Timber Co. v. Dept. of Labor, 277 U.S. 135 (1928); Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); Millers' Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926); Ex parte Rosengrant, 213 Ala. 202 (104 So. 409), affirmed 273 U.S. 664 (1927); State Industrial Board of New York v. Terry & Tench Co., 273 U.S. 639 (1926); Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 276 U.S. 467 (1928). Cases cited against the claim were Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930); Gonsalves v. Morse Dry Dock Co., 266 U.S. 171 (1924); Nogueira v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 281 U.S. 128 (1930); Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142 (1928); Employers' Liability Assurance Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 233 (1930). Justice Black also cites Stanley Morrison, Workmen's Compensation and the Maritime Law, 38 Yale L.J. 472 (1929). In the Davis case the Court was not guilty of exaggeration when it declared that "the very closeness of the cases cited * * * has caused much serious confusion," and went on to picture rather vividly the jurisdictional dilemma of an injured employee who might suffer great financial loss as a result of the delay and expense if he guessed wrong, and might even discover that his claim was "barred by the statute of limitations in the proper forum while he was erroneously pursuing it elsewhere." 317 U.S. 249, 254. Likewise the dilemma affected employers who might not be protected by contributions to a State fund and at the same time be liable for substantial additional payments. The Court had harsh words for the Jensen rule but indicated that its reversal would not solve the problem. Ibid. 256. Justice Black also pointed to Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U.S. 244 (1941), where the Court, after stating that Congress by the Longshoremen's Act accepted the Jensen line of demarcation between State and federal jurisdiction, had proceeded to hold that, in shadowy cases where the claimant was in a twilight zone he was entitled to recover under the State statute in the absence of federal administrative action under the Longshoremen's Act on the ground of its constitutionality. In brief it would seem that in shadowy cases a claimant may elect either a federal court applying the Longshoremen's Act or a State forum applying the State compensation law.
[399] 317 U.S. 219, 259.
[400] 21 Wall. 558 (1875).
[401] Ibid. 572.
[402] Ibid. 574-575.
[403] The "Lottawanna," 21 Wall. 558, 577.
[404] In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 12 (1891).