[695] Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U.S. 148 (1898); Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231 (1895).
[696] Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101 (1898).
[697] Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 36, 44 (1926). In addition to the cases cited above see Ex parte Fonda, 117 U.S. 516 (1886); Duncan v. McCall, 139 U.S. 449 (1891); New York v. Eno, 155. U.S. 89 (1894); Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898); Matter of Moran, 203 U.S. 96 (1906); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944). Compare, however, Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948), where it was held that failure of the petitioner to appeal to the Supreme Court from a conviction sustained by the Florida Supreme Court did not bar relief by habeas corpus because of denial of counsel. In Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944), the rule pertaining to the exhaustion of remedies was applied so as to include a certiorari petition in the Supreme Court. In adopting a new United States Code in 1948 (62 Stat. 967) Congress added a new section to existing habeas corpus provisions which stipulated that no application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court shall be granted until the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the States and that an applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted State remedies if he has the right under State law to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254. This section codified Ex parte Hawk.
[698] 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
[699] 258 U.S. 254 (1922).
[700] Ibid. 259.
[701] Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 27-28 (1820).
[702] Carriage Tax Act, 1 Stat. 373 (1794); License Tax on Wine and Spirits Act, 1 Stat. 376 (1794).
[703] 1 Stat. 302 (1793).
[704] 1 Stat. 414 (1795).