[738] Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232 U.S. 236 (1914).
[739] Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110 (1908); Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261, 265 (1912).
[740] Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915); Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 58 (1919). For the procedural requirements that must be observed in the passage of legislation levying special assessments or establishing assessment districts, see pp. [1058-1059].
[741] Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Industrial Com'n., 24 F. Supp. 370 (1938); Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 Harvard Law Review, 259 (1938).
Whether action of an administrative agency, which voluntarily affords notice and hearing in proceedings in which due process would require the same, is voided by the fact that the statute in pursuance of which it operates does not expressly provide such protection, is a question as to which the Supreme Court has developed no definitive answer. It appears to favor the doctrine enunciated by State courts to the effect that such statutes are to be construed as impliedly requiring notice and hearing, although, in a few instances, it has uttered comments rejecting this notice-by-implication theory.—See Toombs v. Citizens Bank, 281 U.S. 643 (1930); Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30 (1893); Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U.S. 110 (1922); Cincinnati, N.O. & T.R. Co. v. Kentucky, 115 U.S. 321 (1885). Contra: Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413 (1915); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
[742] Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U.S. 110 (1922); Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926).
[743] North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315-316 (1908). For an exposition of the doctrine applicable for determining the tort liability of administrative officers, see Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540 (1891).
[744] Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925).
[745] 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
[746] Ibid. 140-141.