[827] 316 U.S. 455, 461-462, 474-476 (1942).—Dissenting, Justice Black, with whom Justices Douglas and Murphy were in agreement, acknowledged regretfully that the view that the "Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth applicable to the States * * * has never been accepted by a majority of this Court," and submitted a list of citations showing that by judicial decision, as well as by constitutional and statutory provision, a majority of States require that indigent defendants, in noncapital as well as capital cases, be provided with counsel on request. This evidence, he contended, supports the conclusion that "denial to the poor of a request for counsel in proceedings based on serious charges of crime," has "long been regarded throughout this country as shocking to the 'universal sense of justice.'"
[828] 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
[829] 323 U.S. 485 (1945).
[830] 287 U.S. 45, 69, 71 (1932).
[831] 323 U.S. 471, 476 (1945).
[832] 324 U.S. 42 (1945). See also White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
[833] 326 U.S. 271 (1945).
[834] 324 U.S. 42, 46 (1945).
[835] 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
[836] 327 U.S. 82 (1946). Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissented, the former contending that "the right to counsel means nothing unless it means the right to counsel at each and every step in a criminal proceeding."—Ibid. 89.