[865] 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
[866] Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176. (1912).
[867] Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
[868] Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892).
[869] Ibid. 318-320.
[870] Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1880); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 603 (1900); Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
[871] Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175, 176 (1899).
[872] Ashe v. United States ex rel. Valotta, 270 U.S. 424, 425 (1926).
[873] Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947); Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 585 (1948).—Both cases reject the proposition that the commandment of the Sixth Amendment, which requires a jury trial in criminal cases in the federal courts is picked up by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to become a limitation upon the States.
[874] Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 283-284 (1947).—Since Congress, by way of enforcing the guarantees contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, has, by statute [18 Stat. 336, 377 (1875); 8 U.S.C. 44], made it a crime to exclude a citizen from jury service only on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, the Supreme Court "never has interfered with the composition of State court juries except in cases where this guidance of Congress was applicable." Without suggesting that "no case of discrimination in jury drawing except those involving race or color can carry such unjust consequences as to amount to a denial of * * * due process," the Court has nevertheless required that a defendant, alleging grounds not covered by that statute, "must comply with the exacting requirements of proving clearly" that the procedure in his case was destructive of due process.