[884] 310 U.S. 530 (1940).
[885] 314 U.S. 219, 237 (1941). This dictum represents the closest approach which the Court thus far has made toward inclusion of the privilege against self-incrimination within the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In all but a few of the forced confession cases, however, the results achieved by application of the Fair Trial doctrine differ scarcely at all from those attainable by incorporation of the privilege within that clause.
[886] 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
[887] 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
[888] See Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930).
[889] 322 U.S. 143, 160-162 (1944).—All members of the Court were in accord, however, in condemning, as no less a denial of due process, the admission at the second trial of Ashcraft [Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1946)] of evidence uncovered in consequence of the written confession, acceptance of which at the first trial had led to the reversal of his prior conviction.
[890] 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
[891] Ibid. 602.—Of three Justices who dissented, Justice Murphy, with whom Justice Black was associated, declared that it was "inconceivable * * * that the second confession was free from the coercive atmosphere that admittedly impregnated the first one"; and added that previous decisions of this Court "in effect have held that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the prohibition [of the Fifth pertaining to self-incrimination] applicable to the States."—Ibid. 605-606.
[892] 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
[893] Chief Justice Stone, together with Justices Roberts, Reed, and Jackson, all of whom dissented, would have sustained the conviction.