[960] Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915).
[961] Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923).
[962] Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946). See also Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), supra p. [1110].
[963] Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116, 117 (1934).
[964] Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
[965] Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427, 429 (1943). The Court also declared that the due process clause did "not draw to itself the provisions of State constitutions or State laws."
[966] Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
[967] Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 202 (1948). See also Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942), wherein the Court also stated that where a conviction in a criminal prosecution is based upon a general verdict that does not specify the ground on which it rests, and one of the grounds upon which it may rest is invalid under the Constitution, the judgment cannot be sustained.
[968] Paterno v. Lyons, 334 U.S. 314, 320-321 (1948).
[969] McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).—The prohibition of the requirement of excessive bail, expressed in the Eighth Amendment as a restraint against the Federal Government, has never been deemed to be applicable to the States by virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in a recent civil suit, a United States District Court judge asserted his belief, by way of dictum, that protection against "unreasonable searches and seizures, invasion of freedom of speech and press, unlawful and unwarranted incarcerations, arrests, and failure to allow reasonable bail would all be fundamental rights protected by [the Fourteenth] Amendment from State invasion."—International Union, Etc. v. Tennessee Copper Co., 31 F. Supp. 1015 (1940).