[1045] Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 106 (1878).
[1046] Fire Asso. of Philadelphia v. New York, 119 U.S. 110 (1886); Santa Clara County v. Southern P.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
[1047] Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890). (Emphasis supplied.)
[1048] Louisville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1928).
Classification for purposes of taxation has been held valid in the following situations:
Banks: a heavier tax on banks which make loans mainly from money of depositors than on other financial institutions which make loans mainly from money supplied otherwise than by deposits. First Nat. Bank v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 289 U.S. 60 (1933).
Bank deposits: a tax of 50¢ per $100 on deposits in banks outside a State in contrast with a rate of 10¢ per $100 on deposits in the State. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
Coal: a tax of 2-1/2 percent on anthracite but not on bituminous coal. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
Gasoline: a graduated severance tax on oils sold primarily for their gasoline content, measured by resort to Baumé gravity. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146 (1930).
Chain stores: a privilege tax graduated according to the number of stores maintained, State Tax Comr's. v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931); Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87 (1935); a license tax based on the number of stores both within and without the State, Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937).