[2] 110 U.S. 651, 665 (1884); citing Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 389 (1881). This affirmative view was later reiterated in Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 363 (1915).
[3] Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 360, 363-364 (1915).
[4] Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
[5] Ibid. 275.
[6] Cases involving this and related issues are also discussed under the equal protection clause, p. [1163].
[7] United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
[8] Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
[9] Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932).
[10] Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 55 (1935).
[11] 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Notwithstanding that the South Carolina Legislature, after the decision in Smith v. Allwright, repealed all statutory provisions regulating primary elections and political organizations conducting them, a political party thus freed of control is not to be regarded as a private club and for that reason exempt from the constitutional prohibitions against racial discrimination contained in the Fifteenth Amendment. Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. (2d) 387 (1947); certiorari denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948). See also Brown v. Baskin, 78 F. Supp. 933, 940 (1948) which held violative of the Fifteenth Amendment a requirement of a South Carolina political party, which excluded Negroes from membership, that white as well as Negro qualified voters, as a prerequisite for voting in its primary, take an oath that they will support separation of the races.