[170] لاشى.
[171] هويت, a substantive formed from هو, hu, “he is” (Yahu Yehovah).
[172] I interpret in this place the word sárí in the sense which is given to it by the commentator of the Gulshen Raz, in a passage of that work which will be quoted hereafter.
[173] The above shí and láshí is evidently the sad asat, “being, not being,” of the Hindus, an attribute of the divinity, combined with its unity. “For,” says the author of Gulshen Raz (see German Transl., p. 17), “unity exists in non-existence as well as in existence; multiplicity proceeds but from relation; difference and variety of things proceed from the change of the possible: as the existence of both is but one, they furnish the proof that God is but one.”
[174] اعيان الثابته. Aâyan signifies “substances:” these are things which maintain themselves by themselves; or realities, which occupy a space by themselves, without their existence in space depending upon the concomitant existence of another thing. This is the contrary of accidents, the existence of which depends upon the concomitant existence of the substance which serves to support them, or which is the place by which they are supported. Aâyán sabitah, that is, “fixed substances,” are realities of things inclosed in the science of God, that is to say, the figures of realities of divine names in the scientific presence. They are posterior to God only as to essence, and not as to time; for they are eternal, as much on the side of the past as on the side of the future. When it is said, that God produces them by emanation, the posteriority which is thereby expressed, refers but to essence, and is not true in any other sense.—(See Jorjani’s Definitions in Ext. et Not. des MSS., vol. X. p. 65.)—We may, in a language more familiar to us perhaps, express them by “eternal ideals,” or “prototypes of realities.” Silvestre de Sacy adds to Jorjani’s explanation, that the question is here about divine names, that is, attributes of God as emanating from his essence, and residing in him, but not yet produced externally by any action. The scientific presence mentioned in this explanation appears, to him, to signify the divine majesty, inasmuch as manifesting its presence to beings which have no other existence but in the science of God.
[175] ارادت, “inclination, design, will,” According to Jorjáni’s Definitions (see Ext. et Not. des MSS., vol. X. p. 37), iradet is a quality which produces in a living being a state, the effect of which is that he acts in one manner rather than in another. In its exact sense, it is a faculty which has no other object in view but that which does not exist; for “the will” is an attribute, the special object of which is to give existence to any thing, and to produce it conformably with the words of the Koran: “When he wills a thing he says to it: “Be,” and it is.” Iradet is also interpreted an inclination to any thing which follows the opinion of utility, and in this sense I have translated it above “providence.”
[176] كن فيكون.
[177] I think it ought to be Shabisteri instead of Shosteri, as I find in Baron von Hammer’s Gulshen-raz (pp. 27-32) a treatise entitled Hak ol yakin, as above, attributed to the before quoted Mahmud Shebisteri (vol. I. p. 82), of whom more hereafter. The whole title of the above-mentioned work is Hak ol yukin fi mâarifet-i-rebbil âalemin, “the truth of conviction in the knowledge of the Lord of the world.”
[178] The word yakin signifies “an intuitive certainty,” produced by energy of faith, and not by arguments and proofs.