The cause of this misfortune is manifest. France permitted her trade to go on as in time of peace, as individuals pleased, and without convoy. It was thought better to employ their ships of war in cruising for the privateers, than in convoying and defending their vessels against them. It was not considered, that privateers always go single, that they are swift and small, that it is difficult to find a small and single ship at sea, and that an East or West India prize is worth fifty privateers. The consequences have been proportioned to the plan. France has captured some little privateers of England, the English the large and rich East and West India ships of the French. This is a misfortune, from which I would wish to warn and guard Spain.
The English have greater expectations of rich and numerous prizes in a Spanish than in a French war. If they are disappointed in this, such a war would soon become unpopular and unmaintainable. Now the means of disappointing their expectations are, as I conceive, these. To lay an embargo on all the merchant vessels of Spain, both in Europe and America, at the commencement of hostilities. Not to suffer their merchantmen or galleons, which are the great objects of English avidity, to go out of their ports but with strong convoys. So secured, they could not be captured but by a fleet or strong squadron of the enemy. But fleets and large squadrons hardly ever make prizes; nor from their nature and circumstances can they do it. Privateers, frigates, and single ships of force, are those only which cruise with effect against merchantmen. Defended from these, the commerce of Spain will go safe and secure, the hopes of the enemy will be disappointed, they will sustain all the burthen of the war without reaping any of its expected benefits.
Such a war must soon become unpopular; and the wisest Ministers in the best of times cannot long sustain an unpopular war in England, much less can it be sustained in times of great and manifest difficulty and distress, and by Ministers who have not given the most distinguished proofs of their wisdom. There is no human event more sure than that Spain, if she secures her commerce from the depredations of the enemy, must soon reduce Great Britain to whatever equitable terms she pleases. Add to this, that if while the fleet of France keeps that of England in check in the channel and in the bay, the fleet of Spain should completely block up the Mediterranean, so as to intercept all communication with Gibraltar and Minorca, these strong holds must inevitably surrender in a few months.
I may, therefore, be now permitted to repeat with more confidence than ever, that it is in the power of Spain to clip the wings of Great Britain, and pinion her for ever.
ARTHUR LEE.
JOHN ADAMS TO ARTHUR LEE.
L’Orient, June 10th, 1779.
Dear Sir,
I have the honor of your letter from Paris, of the 5th of this month, in which you inform me, that by advices from America your enemies are determined to impeach your attachment to our country and her cause, and in which you request my opinion on that point, from the knowledge I have had of your conduct, while we acted together in commission.