TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.
Passy, February 21st, 1779.
My dear Marquis,
The conversation with which you honored me last evening, has induced me to give you the trouble of this letter upon the same subject.
It is certain that a loan of money is very much needed to redeem the redundancy of our paper bills, and without it, it is impossible to foresee what will be the consequence to their credit, and therefore every service, that may be rendered in order to obtain it from this kingdom, from Spain, or Holland, will be a most acceptable service.
But without some other exertions, even a loan perhaps would be but a temporary relief; with them a smaller loan might suffice. You know perfectly well, that the enemy in America are at present very weak, and in great distress in every part. They are weak in Canada, weak in Halifax, weak in Rhode Island, weak in New York, weak in the Floridas, and weak in every one of the West India Islands. A strong armament of ships of the line, with five thousand troops, directed against Halifax, Rhode Island, or New York, must infallibly succeed. So it must against the Floridas, so it must against Canada, or any one of the West India Islands.
You are very sensible, that in this state of weakness, the British possessions in America depend upon each other for reciprocal support. The troops and ships derive such supplies of provisions from Canada and Nova Scotia, that if these places or either of them were lost, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the other to subsist. The West India Islands derive such supplies from the Floridas, that if they were lost the others could hardly subsist. Their fleets and armies in Canada, Halifax, Rhode Island, New York, and the Floridas, receive supplies of rum, sugar, molasses, &c. from the West India Islands, without which they could scarcely subsist. Every part of their possessions in America, both on the continent and in the islands, receives constant supplies from Europe, from England, Scotland, and Ireland, without which they must fall. You perceive, therefore, that their dominions in America at present form such a chain, that the links mutually support each other in such a manner, that if one or two were taken away, the whole, or at least the greater part, must fall. In this state of things then, the obvious policy is to send a strong squadron of ships of the line to co-operate with the Count d'Estaing and the American army, in some expedition directed against New York, Rhode Island, Halifax or perhaps all of them in course. Five or six thousand troops would be quite enough. Above all, it is indispensably necessary to keep a clear naval superiority, both on the coast of the continent, and in the West Islands. This together with French and American privateers would make such havoc among the enemy's transports, passing from one of their possessions to another, as must ruin their affairs. The French have a great advantage in carrying on this kind of war in America, at present. The British ships are badly manned and in bad repair. They cannot send them into the American seas, without the utmost terror for their own coasts. And when they are in America, they have not such advantages for supplies of provisions, naval stores, &c. as the French.
The devastation, which was made among their ships of the line, frigates, transports, and traders, in the American seas the last summer, shows how much might be done, if a stronger force were sent there. As long as the enemy have possession of New York and Rhode Island, so long it will be necessary for us to keep up large armies, to watch their motions, and defend the country against them, which will oblige us to emit more paper, and still further to increase the depreciation. Now as long as they maintain the dominion of those seas, their troops will be protected by the cannon of their ships, and we could not dislodge them with an army, however large, at least we could not keep possession of those places. But if their force was captivated in those seas, as it might easily be by a sea force, co-operating with the land forces, we might reduce our army and innumerable other articles of expense. We need not emit any more paper, and that already out would depreciate no further. I should be happy to have further conversation with you, Sir, upon these subjects, or to explain anything by letter, which may be in my power.
With the highest sentiments of esteem and respect, I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.