The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 05

by Unknown

I pretend not to know, to what part of America M. de Ternay and M. de Rochambeau are destined, but to whatever part it is, whether Canada, Nova Scotia, New York, Carolina, or Georgia, I have no hopes of anything decisive from their operations, although they should be instructed to co-operate with General Washington. If they should be destined against Canada or Nova Scotia, they may succeed; but this success will not be decisive. If they are intended against New York, I have no hopes of their success. The naval force is not sufficient to command the seas. Admiral Graves, added to the ships before at New York, will be superior; and I shall venture to give my opinion, that without a superiority of naval force, clear and indisputable, New York will never be taken. It is so situated, so fortified, it is garrisoned with troops so accustomed to war, and so embittered and inflamed by cruel passions, carefully nursed up in their breasts by their King and their Generals, and it is universally regarded by them a port of such essential importance, that I confess I should despair of success against it, with an army twice as numerous as that of the Generals Washington and Rochambeau united, while the English are masters of the seas, or even while they have there an equality of naval power.

Most people in Europe have wondered at the inactivity of the American army, for these two years past; but it is merely from want of knowledge and attention. The true cause of it is, the English have confined themselves to their strong holds in seaport towns, and have been sheltered from all attacks and insults by the guns of their men-of-war, and forever will be so, while they have the superiority at sea. If our army had been three times as numerous as it was, it must have remained inactive, without a fleet to co-operate with it; for an attack upon New York without a fleet, would have been only sacrificing the lives of thousands of brave men, without a possibility of succeeding.

Had the English two years ago marched into the country from Philadelphia, instead of retreating back with precipitation to New York, Europe would have heard more of the exertions of the American army, so much more, that in my serious opinion, you would have heard of their total destruction. As it was, they were closely pursued, attacked, and if not beaten, they had much the worst of the action, for besides their loss in killed and wounded, and in those who perished under the fatigue and heat of the day, not less than five hundred deserted from them, and their desertions would have been multiplied in every unsuccessful engagement within the country.

If in the last year the British army had marched out into the country, instead of remaining under cover of their men-of-war, I am equally clear, that they would have been ruined. The English, ever since the alliance, have been fearfully apprehensive of an attack upon their strong holds upon the coast by the French. This it was that induced them to retreat from Philadelphia to New York, and this has kept them almost wholly confined to that garrison the last year. I mention this, merely to wipe off the imputations said to result from the inactivity of our army, since the alliance, by showing the true cause of it, that it proceeds not from any change of sentiments in the Americans, but from the change of the mode of prosecuting the war on the part of our enemies.

I am, however, clearly of opinion, and I know it to be the general sense of America, that the English, both in North America and in the West India Islands, have been for these two years past absolutely in the power of their enemies; and that they are so now, and will continue to be so, in such a degree, that nothing will be wanting but attention to their situation, and a judicious application of the forces of the allies to accomplish the entire reduction of their power in America. In order to show this, let me beg your Excellency's attention to a few remarks upon the situation of the English, and upon the method of applying the force of the allies so as to reduce them.

The English are in possession of Canada, a province vastly extensive, and in which there is a great number of ports, at a great distance from each other, necessary to be maintained among a people too, who are by no means attached to them, but who would readily afford all the assistance in their power to the united forces of France and the United States, and who would join them in considerable numbers. In this whole province, the English have not, comprehending the garrisons of all their ports, more than four thousand men.

The English are in possession of Nova Scotia; they have in Halifax and the other parts of the province, and at Penobscot, about three thousand men. But the people of this province being descendants and emigrants from New England, chiefly, are discontented with the British government, and desirous of joining the United States. They are in possession of New York Island, Staten Island, and Long Island, where they have in all of regular British troops, —— thousand men. The militia, volunteers, &c. of whom they make such an ostentatious display in the despatches of their Generals, and in the gazette of St James, are of very little consideration; their numbers are much exaggerated; it is force, fear, and policy, that enrol the greater part of them; there are perhaps fifteen thousand inhabitants of the city. These, together with the army and navy, are fed and supplied with provisions, and stores, and fuel, and their cattle and horses with forage, brought by sea from Quebec, Halifax, Ireland, and the West Indies, except the small quantity, which they draw from Long Island and Staten Island.

They are now in possession of Charleston, in South Carolina, and Savannah, in Georgia. Their armies and navies in these places, as well as the inhabitants, must be chiefly supplied by sea in the same manner. They are still perhaps in possession of St Augustine, in East Florida, and Pensacola, in the west. From these places, they have drawn of late years great supplies of lumber and provisions for their West India Islands. The number of troops in Georgia and Carolina may amount to —— thousands. They are in possession of Jamaica, Barbadoes, Antigua, St Christophers, and St Lucia, and other islands. These draw supplies of provisions and lumber, &c. from Quebec, Halifax, Pensacola, and Augustine, that is from the Floridas. The number of troops they have in each island, I am not able to ascertain; but certainly they are not strong in any of them; and the climate in the West Indies, and in Georgia and Carolina, is making a rapid consumption of their men.

From this sketch, it will be easily seen, what a great number of posts they have to sustain; how these are mutually connected with, and dependent on each other, and that their existence in all of them depends upon their superiority at sea, and that to carry on the intercourse and communication between these various places, a vast number of transports, provision vessels and merchant ships are necessary. This is so much the fact, that the English nation has now little navigation left, but what is employed in maintaining the communication of these places with one another and with Europe. Here then it is, that the English commerce and navy is vulnerable; and this it is, which clearly points out to their enemies the only sure and certain way of reducing their power in that quarter of the world; and if it is reduced there, it is brought into a narrow compass everywhere.

The policy and necessity of keeping always a superior fleet both in the West India Islands and on the coast of the continent of North America, is from all this very obvious. The English are so sensible of this, that they dread it as the greatest evil that can befall them. The appearance of the Count d'Estaing upon the coast of North America, never failed to throw the English into the utmost terror and consternation.