1. The territory of Zealand consists of five or six islands, two of which are moderately large, and the rest very small. These islands are formed in the mouth of the (Escaut) Scheldt, by the sea, or by the different branches of the Scheldt itself. In case of a sudden invasion, these islands separated from the Province of Holland by an arm of the sea, are too unconnected to receive any immediate assistance. Such an invasion is so much the more easy for the English, as Zealand is very near them. They may invade this Province even before a suspicion should be conceived that the project had been formed. Who shall oppose their enterprise? Shall it be the French, who are now friendly? Dunkirk, it is true, is near enough, but what forces are there at Dunkirk? The only naval force there, consists of a few privateers, who could neither oppose an armament escorted by British men-of-war, nor venture to transport troops to oppose it, even supposing the invasion was not made by surprise. Shall the Zealanders themselves make a resistance to the English? But separated from one another by waters, which would necessarily retard their junction, the island of Walcheren, the principal of all, would be in possession of the enemy before they could put themselves in a posture to repel force by force. It is, moreover, not only possible but easy to make a descent upon Zealand by so many places, that the Zealanders with their own forces alone could not defend effectually all the passages. Eight thousand English, or even a smaller number would force the Zealanders everywhere, because there is nowhere a fortress capable of holding out twelve hours. The ports of Flushing and Veere are the only ones which have any defence; but they are very far from the state in which they ought to be, to stop an enemy determined upon pillage, animated by revenge, and whom the pleasure of doing mischief instigates forcibly. It is conceded that if the English descended in Zealand, they would be constrained to abandon it very soon; that they might and would be driven from it in a few days; that the figure which they would make would be neither glorious nor honorable, and that their temerity would cost them dear; but the disorder caused by an invasion remains after the expulsion of the invaders. The people invaded are always the victims of the evils which they have suffered, and these evils, always considerable to the individuals, are seldom compensated entirely. When an incendiary has burned my house, whether he is punished or not, my house is consumed and lost to me. The exactions, the pillage, and all the abominations which follow the coups de main of an unbridled soldiery, would be cruelly felt by the unfortunate Zealanders, even after the perpetrators should be driven out, or sacrificed to the public resentment.
2. The peculiar commerce of Zealand. This Province has no other than that small commerce, which is known by the name of the coasting trade. This kind of trade is considerable in the Provinces of Holland, North Holland, and Friesland. The number of vessels employed in these three Provinces in this kind of trade is inconceivable, and the greatest part of them is destined for the service of France. All which France receives from foreigners, and all which it furnishes to foreigners, is carried in these Holland vessels, and if there was no other than the freight for the masters and owners of these vessels, this profit would still be of the greatest consideration. Thus it is not surprising that the Province of Holland has taken such strong measures in favor of France. Its particular commerce would naturally determine it this way. On the contrary, Zealand employs the small number of her merchant ships in a commerce with England, a commerce so much the more lucrative, as it is almost entirely contraband or smuggled.
The profits to be made on brandy and other spirituous liquors, imported clandestinely into England, are very considerable; and it is Zealand that makes these profits, because they are her subjects who entertain a continual correspondence with the English smugglers. The proximity of the coasts of Zealand to those of England, renders this commerce, which is prohibited to English subjects, sure for the inhabitants of Zealand. Fishing barks are sufficient to carry it on, and these barks are rarely taken, whether it is that they are difficult to take, or whether there is not much desire to take them. These barks, arrived upon the coasts of England, find others which come to take what they bring. The place where this traffic is held, is generally some creek upon the coast of England, where the vessel may be loaded and unloaded in secrecy. Moreover, those whom the English Ministry appoint to prevent this commerce at sea, are those who favor it. We know very well the decided inclination of the English in general, and, above all, of their seamen for strong liquors. Zealand, concurring openly in the measures, which the Republic is now taking against England, or, if you will, against the powers at war, would draw upon itself particularly the hatred, anger, and vengeance of a nation, without which it is impossible to sustain its trade, and this Province would, by this means, deprive a great number of its subjects of a source of gain, which places them in a condition to furnish the imposts which they have to pay. Is it not then the part of prudence in the States of Zealand, to avoid with care everything that might embroil them, particularly with England? Is it not also the wisdom of the States-General to have a regard to the critical situation of one of the Seven Provinces which compose the union?
3. The weakness of her internal forces. Zealand is open on all sides to the English. To set them at defiance, she ought to have in herself forces capable of intimidating Great Britain. But where are such forces to be found? In the garrisons, which the Republic maintains there? Two or three thousand men dispersed at Flushing, at Veere, and in some other cities, are but a feeble defence against a descent of six or seven thousand English, well determined. Will these troops of the Republic be supported by armed citizens? Suppose it; their defeat will be not less certain. These citizens, who have never seen a loaded musket discharged, are more proper to carry an empty fusil, to mount guard at a state-house, which is never to be attacked, than to march to the defence of a coast threatened with a descent, or to present themselves upon the parapet of a fort, battered with machines that vomit forth death. These citizens, or rather these soldiers of a moment, would carry disorder into the ranks, and do more injury than service, by giving countenance to the flight of those brave warriors, who make it a point of honor to combat with a steadfast foot. Moreover, who are these citizens, which might be joined to the regular troops? Are they the principal inhabitants? Those who have the most to lose? Those to whom birth and education have given sentiments of honor and of glory? No. These have, by paying sums of money, exemptions, which excuse them from taking arms, to defend the country in time of peace. Is it credible that in the most critical moments they will generously renounce these exemptions? It will be, then, the citizens of the second order, the artisans, or people who have little or nothing to lose, who will serve for the reinforcement to the veterans. Experience demonstrates what dependence is to be placed at this day upon such militia. It would be in vain to oppose to this the time of the revolution, those times of the heroism of the ancestors of the Dutch. The cause is not the same; they attack at this day in a different fashion, and perhaps the defence too would be made in a very different manner. It might be otherwise, if the coasts of Zealand were fortified with good forts, or if the cities of Flushing and Veere were in a condition to sustain a siege of some months, and with their little garrisons stop the assailants, until the arrival of succors. But one must be very little informed not to know that the English, although they should be incommoded in their landing, would nevertheless effect it with little loss.
4. The state of her finances. Zealand, of all the Seven Provinces, is that which costs the most for the maintenance of her dykes. More exposed than all the others to be drowned by the sea, her coasts require continual repairs. These reparations cannot be made, but at great expense. Unprovided with wood suitable for the construction of ramparts capable of stopping the waves, which beat upon her continually, she is obliged to import from foreigners those numberless and enormous timbers, which art substitutes in the place of those rocks, which nature has granted to other countries, for holding in the ocean and restraining its fury. It is necessary, therefore, that a great part of the public revenue of the Province should go to foreigners. She must, moreover, furnish her quota to the general treasury of the Republic; from whence it follows, that she cannot expose herself to the indispensable necessity of increasing her imposts, to furnish the new expenses, which an extraordinary armament would bring upon all the State. More than once, in time of peace, the public coffers of the State have been obliged to furnish to the Province of Zealand, the succors which she could not find at home, without reducing her subjects to the most horrible distress. To what condition, then, would those subjects be reduced, if in the progress of the armed neutrality, such as is proposed, or in a war with England, they should still be obliged to pay new contributions? All the world agrees that Zealand is poor; it must be acknowledged then that she will be plunged in the lowest indigence, if the expenses of the country are augmented, although there are many individuals in Zealand who are very rich and grand capitalists, and luxury among the great is carried to excess as immoderate as it is in Holland. Zealand has so long embarrassed the Republic in all their deliberations concerning the armed neutrality, and lately concerning the serious quarrel, that England has commenced against her, that I thought it would at least gratify the curiosity of Congress to see the causes which have governed, laid open, as I find them explained in conversation and in public writers. Zealand's reasons seem to be now overruled, and the Prince's absolute authority there of little avail. To all appearances, the English must recede, or contend with a bitter enemy in this Republic. Old prejudices seem to wear off, and it is now said publicly, that the friendship between the English and Dutch has been like the brotherly love between Cain and Abel; yet I can never depend upon anything here until it is past, I have been so often disappointed in my expectations.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Amsterdam, December 31st, 1780.