I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.


TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, April 18th, 1780.

Sir,

It is my duty to transmit to Congress, as soon as prudence will admit, everything which deserves consideration, as having either a direct, or an indirect tendency to peace, or even to negotiations for that important object. The enclosed letter has been transmitted to Paris through such a channel, that I have reason to believe, that it was particularly intended for my inspection. It is from a gentleman, who, to do him justice, has long expressed an earnest desire for peace, but who, nevertheless, has never yet reflected maturely enough upon the state of America, of Great Britain, and of all Europe, to get into a right way of thinking, concerning the proper means to his end. Congress will perceive this from the letter itself, in which it is obvious enough.

The first remarkable sentiment is, "We must at all events support our national honor, by the most vigorous exertions, without shrinking; but surely, in such a complicated war as this is, if we can make any equitable offers of a treaty to any of the parties, common prudence calls upon us to use our endeavors to unravel by negotiation, the combination of powers now acting against us." In this paragraph, I see the manifest marks of a mind that has not yet mastered its subject. True policy would have omitted everything in this letter, which should call up to the minds of the people the ideas of national honor. Every man in the world, who is thoroughly acquainted with the subject, knows that Great Britain never can obtain a peace without a diminution of her honor and dignity. It is impossible without miracles, and therefore the Englishman, who undertakes to plan for peace, must be convinced of this and take it into his plan, and consequently should avoid with the utmost caution every word, which should excite these ideas in the minds of the people. They stir passions which make them mad.

He should have avoided with equal solicitude every insinuation of a design to unravel, by negotiation, the combination of powers now acting against Great Britain. This combination is in fact much more extensive, much more universal and formidable, than the letter writer had any idea or suspicion of. But if it had been no more extensive than France, Spain, and America, the impracticability of unravelling it ought to have thrown out this sentiment. By it he proposes by negotiation to bring those to dishonor themselves, who have certainly no occasion for it; at the same time that he stimulates others to cherish and preserve their honor, who have already lost it, and under an absolute necessity, sooner or later, of sacrificing it. By this means he only puts the confederates more upon their guard, and renders the attainment of his professed object, peace, impossible.

The next solecism in politics, which he commits, is undertaking to vindicate America from the charge of having sought and formed this confederacy. America wanted no such vindication; it is folly to suppose it a fault, for all mankind will agree, even his correspondents themselves, that it was wisdom and virtue. Surely another term must be given to popular ideas, before they will be brought to petition for peace.