"That, encouraged by this reflection, the petitioners assure themselves, that your Noble and Great Lordships will honor with the same approbation the step, which they take to day, to recommend to your Noble and Great Lordships, in a manner the most respectful, but at the same time the most pressing, the prompt and efficacious execution of the aforesaid resolution of their Noble and Grand Mightinesses, of the 28th of March last, with everything which depends thereon, a proceeding, which does not spring from a desire, on the part of the petitioners, to raise themselves above the sphere of their duties and vocations, or to interfere indiscreetly in the affairs of government; but only from a conviction, that it cannot but be agreeable to well-intentioned Regents (such as your Noble and Grand Lordships have shown yourselves by deeds to the good citizens) to see themselves applauded in their salutary efforts and patriotic designs, and supported against the perverse views and secret machinations of the ill disposed, who, however small their number, are always found in a nation.
"That, although the petitioners may be convinced, that their Noble and Grand Mightinesses, having taken a resolution so agreeable to all true patriots, will not neglect to employ means to carry it to an efficacious conclusion among the other confederates, and to procure to the good citizens the real enjoyment of the commerce with United America, they cannot, nevertheless, dissemble, that lately some new reasons have arisen, which make them conceive some fears respecting the prompt consummation of this desirable affair.
"That the probability of an offer of peace, on the part of Great Britain, to United America, whereof the petitioners made mention in their former request, having at present become a full certainty, by the revolution arrived since in the British Ministry, they have not learnt without uneasiness, the attempt made at the same time by the new Ministers of the Court of London, to involve this State in a negotiation for a separate peace, the immediate consequence of which would be (as the petitioners fear) a cessation of all connexions with the American Republic; whilst, that in the meantime, our Republic, deprived on the one hand of the advantages, which it reasonably promises itself from those connexions, might, on the other, be detained by negotiations, spun out to a great length, and not effect till late, perhaps after the other belligerent powers, a separate peace with England.
"That, in effect, the difficulties which oppose themselves to a like partial pacification, are too multiplied for one to promise himself to see them suddenly removed; such as the restitution of the possessions taken from the State, and retaken from the English by France, a restitution, which thereby is become impracticable; the indemnification of the immense losses, that the unexpected and perfidious attack of England has caused to the Dutch nation in general, to the petitioners in particular; the assurance of a free navigation for the future, upon the principles of the armed neutrality, and conformably to the law of nations, the dissolution of the bonds, which, without being productive of any utility to the two nations, have been a source of contestations always springing up, and which in every war between Great Britain and any other power, have threatened to involve our Republic in it, or have, in effect, done it; the annihilation (if possible) of the act of navigation, an act, which carries too evident marks of the supremacy affected by England over all other maritime people, not to attract attention at the approaching negotiation of peace; finally, the necessity of breaking the yoke, that Great Britain would impose upon our flag, to make hers respected in the Northern Ocean, as the seat of her maritime empire; and other objects of this nature, which, as the petulant proceedings of the Court of London even have given rise to them, with certainty furnish matter for claims and negotiations.
"That, as by these considerations, even a speedy consummation of a separate peace with England is out of all probability, especially when one compares with them the dubious and limited manner in which it is offered; on the other hand, a general peace appears not to be so far distant, as that to obtain a more prompt reconciliation with England, the Republic has occasion to abandon its interests relative to North America, seeing that the British government has resolved, upon the request of the National Assembly, even to discontinue offensive hostilities against the new Republic, and that even under the present administration of the Ministers, it appears ready to acknowledge positively its independence; an acknowledgment, which, in removing the principal stumbling block of a negotiation of a general peace, will pave the way to a prompt explication of all the difficulties between the belligerent powers.
"That the petitioners should exceed much the bounds of their plan, if they entered into a more ample detail of the reasons, which might be alleged upon this subject, and which certainly will not escape the political penetration of your Noble and Great Lordships; among others, the engagements recently entered into with the Court of France, and which will not be violated by our Republic, which acknowledges the sanctity of its engagements and respects them, but which will serve much rather to convince the Empress of Russia of the impossibility of entering, in the present juncture of affairs, into such a negotiation as the Court of London proposes, when it will not be permitted to presume, but that sovereign will feel herself the change of circumstances, which have happened with regard to America, since the offer of her mediation, by the revolution of the British Ministry; and that she ought even to regard a separate peace between our States and England, as the most proper mean to retard the general tranquillity, that she has endeavored to procure to all the commercial nations now at war.
"That, from these motives, the petitioners respectfully hope, that the aforesaid offer of England will occasion no obstacle, which may prevent, that the resolution of their Noble and Grand Mightinesses, to acknowledge the independence of North America, and to conclude with that power a treaty of commerce, may not have a prompt execution, nor that even one only of the other confederates will suffer itself to be diverted thereby, from the design of opening unanimously with this Province and the others, which have declared themselves conformably to Holland, negotiations with the United States, and of terminating them as soon as may be.
"That the favorable resolutions already taken for this effect in Zealand, Utrecht, Overyssel, and at present (as the petitioners learn) in the Province of Groningen, after the example of Holland and Friesland, confirm them in that hope, and seem to render entirely superfluous a request, that in every other case the petitioners would have found themselves obliged to make with the commercial citizens of the other cities, to the end, that by the resistance of one Province, not immediately interested in commerce and navigation, they might not be deprived of the advantages and of the protection, that the Sovereign Assembly of their proper Province had been disposed to procure them without that; but that to the end to provide for it, their Noble and Grand Mightinesses, and the States of the other Provinces, in this respect unanimous with them, should make use of the power, which belongs to each free State of our Federative Republic, at least in regard to treaties of commerce, of which there exists an example in 1649, not only in a treaty of redemption of the toll of the Sound, but also in a defensive treaty, concluded with the Crown of Denmark by the three Provinces of Guelderland, Holland, and Friesland.
"But as every apprehension of a similar dissension among the members of the confederation appears at present absolutely unseasonable, the petitioners will confine themselves rather to another request, to wit, that after the formation of connexions of commerce with North America, the effectual enjoyment of it may be assured to the commercial citizens of this country by a sufficient protection of the navigation, seeing, that without the protection of the navigation, the conclusion even of such a treaty of commerce would be absolutely illusory; that since a long time, especially last year, the petitioners have tasted the bitter fruits of the defenceless state in which the Dutch flag has been incessantly found, as they have already said, conformably to the truth, in their first request, 'that by the total stagnation of the navigation and of expeditions, they have felt in the most painful manner the effects of the hostile and unforeseen attack of Great Britain, and that they feel them still every day;' that in the meantime this stagnation of commerce, absolutely abandoned to the rapacity of an enemy, greedy of pillage, and destitute of all protection whatsoever, has appeared to the petitioners, as well as to all the other commercial inhabitants, yes, even to all true citizens, so much the more hard and afflicting, as they not only have constantly contributed with a good heart all the public imposts, but that, at the time even that commerce was absolutely abandoned to itself, and deprived of all safeguard, it supported a double charge to obtain that protection, which it has never enjoyed, seeing that the hope of such a protection, (the Republic not being entirely without maritime force) has appeared indeed more than once, but has always vanished in the most unexpected manner, by accidents and impediments, which if they have given rise, perhaps wrongfully, to discontent and to distrust among the good citizens, will not, nevertheless, be read and meditated by posterity, without surprise.
"That, without intention to legitimate in any fashion the suspicions arising from this failure of protection, the petitioners believe themselves, nevertheless, with all proper respect, warranted in addressing their complaints on this head to the bosoms of your Great and Noble Lordships, and (seeing the commerce with North America cannot subsist without navigation, no more than navigation without a safeguard) of reckoning upon the active direction, the useful employment, and prompt augmentation of our naval forces, in proportion to the means, which shall be the most proper effectually to secure, to the commerce of this Republic, the fruits of its connexions with United North America.