TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
The Hague, September 23d, 1782.
Sir,
As this is a moment of great expectation, news of the greatest importance from the East Indies, from the West Indies and North America, from Gibraltar, from Lord Howe's fleet, and the combined fleet, being hourly looked for, I took this opportunity to return to the Spanish Minister a visit, which I owed him.
He told me, that he trembled for the news we should have from Gibraltar. I asked him if he thought there would be a battle at sea. He answered, yes. He believed the combined fleet would meet Lord Howe, and give him battle. I said, in this case it will probably be but a running fight. His Lordship's object was to protect his convoy and get into the port, and he would not stop to fight more than should be unavoidable. D. Llano, however, said, that he believed the fate of Gibraltar would be decided before Howe could arrive, either the place taken, or the assault given over. By his advices, the attack was to begin the 4th or 5th of September. Howe sailed the 12th, and would be probably twenty days at least on his way, which would leave a space of twentyseven or twentyeight days for the attack, which would decide it one way or the other.
I did not think proper to tell him my own apprehensions, and I wish I may be mistaken, but I have no expectation at all, in my own mind, that the combined fleet will meet Howe; that there will be any naval engagement; or that Gibraltar will surrender. They will make a horrid noise with their artillery against the place; but this noise will not terrify Elliot, and Gibraltar will remain to the English another year, and Lord Howe return to England, and all Europe will laugh. England, however, if she were wise, would say, what is sport to you, is death to us, who are ruined by these expenses. The earnest zeal of Spain to obtain that impenetrable rock, what has it not cost the House of Bourbon this war? And what is the importance of it? A mere point of honor! a trophy of insolence to England, and of humiliation to Spain! It is of no utility, unless as an asylum for privateers in time of war; for it is not to be supposed, that the powers of Europe, now that the freedom of commerce is so much esteemed, will permit either England or Spain to make use of this fortress and asylum as an instrument to exclude any nation from the navigation of the Mediterranean.
From the Hôtel d'Espagne, I went to that of France, and the Duc de la Vauguyon informed me that he had a letter from the Count de Vergennes, informing him that he had received, in an indirect manner, a set of preliminary propositions, as from the British Ministry, which they were said to be ready to sign, that he had sent M. de Rayneval to London, to know with certainty whether those preliminaries came from proper authority or not.
Thus we see, that two Ministers from England, and another from Holland, are at Paris to make peace. The Count d'Aranda is said to have powers to treat on the part of Spain. Mr Franklin and Mr Jay are present on the part of the United States, and M. Gerard de Rayneval is at London. Yet, with all this, the British Ministry have never yet given any proof of their sincerity, nor any authority to any one to treat with the United States. I believe the British Ministry, even my Lord Shelburne would give such powers if he dared. But they dare not. They are afraid of the King, of the old Ministry, and a great party in the nation, irritated every moment by the refugees, who spare no pains, and hesitate at no impostures, to revive offensive hostilities in America. If Gibraltar should be relieved, and their fleets should arrive from the West Indies and the Baltic, and they should not have any very bad news from the East Indies, the nation will recover from its fright, occasioned by the loss of Cornwallis, Minorca, and St Kitts, and the Ministry will not yet dare to acknowledge American independence. In this case, Mr Fox and Mr Burke will lay their foundation of opposition, and the state of the finances will give them great weight. But the Ministry will find means to provide for another campaign.
But to return to the Duc de la Vauguyon, who informed me further, that he had received instructions to propose to the Prince of Orange a new plan of concert of operations, viz; that the Dutch fleet, or at least a detachment of it, should now, in the absence of Lord Howe, sail from the Texel to Brest, and join the French ships there, in a cruise to intercept the British West India fleet. The Prince does not appear pleased with the plan. He has not yet accepted it. The Grand Pensionary appears to approve it, and support it with warmth. There is now a fine opportunity for the Dutch fleet to strike a blow, either alone, upon the Baltic fleet, or in conjunction with the French, or even alone upon the West India fleet. But the main spring of the machine is broken or unbent. There is neither capacity nor good will among those that direct the navy.
At dinner, in the course of the day, with M. Gyzelaar, M. Visscher, and a number of the co-patriots, at the Hôtel de Dort, they lamented this incurable misfortune. Some of them told me, that the sums of money, granted and expended upon their marine, ought to have produced them a hundred and twenty vessels of war of all sizes; whereas they have not one quarter of the number. They have no more than twelve of the line in the Texel, reckoning in the number two fifties; and they have not more than six or seven in all the docks of Amsterdam, Zealand, the Meuse and Friesland, which can be ready next year.