Went next to Mr Laurens, upon the subject of writing to Mr Dana, and found him full in my sentiments, and at my return found answers from Dr Franklin and Mr Laurens to the letters I wrote them, both agreeing that this is the critical moment for Mr Dana to commence his negotiations. Doctor Franklin promises to have an authentic copy made to send to Mr Dana.
In the evening many gentlemen came in, among the rest Mr Bourse, the agent of the Dutch East India company, Who expressed a good deal of anxiety about their negotiations, and feared they should not have justice in the East Indies.
Wednesday, December 4th.—It is proper that I should note here, that in the beginning of the year 1780, soon after my arrival at Paris, Mr Galloway's pamphlets fell into my hands. I wrote a long series of letters to a friend, in answer to them. That friend sent them to England, but the printers dared not publish them. They remained there until last summer, when they were begun to be printed, and are continued to this day, (not being yet quite finished,) in Parker's General Advertiser, but with false dates, being dated in the months of January and February last, under the title of "Letters from a distinguished American." They appear to have been well received, and to have contributed somewhat to unite the nation in accelerating the acknowledgment of American independence, and to convince the nation of the necessity of respecting our alliances, and making peace.
I hope it will be permitted to me, or to some other who can do it better, some ten or fifteen years hence, to collect together in one view, my little negotiations in Europe. Fifty years hence it may be published, perhaps twenty. I will venture to say, however feebly I may have acted my part, or whatever mistakes I may have committed, yet the situations I have been in, between angry nations and more angry factions, have been some of the most singular and interesting, that ever happened to any man. The fury of enemies, as well as of elements, the subtlety and arrogance of allies, and, what has been worse than all, the jealousy, envy, and little pranks of friends and copatriots, would form one of the most instructive lessons in morals and politics, that ever was committed to paper.
Monday, December 9th.—Visited Mr Jay. Mr Oswald came in. We slided from one thing to another, into a very lively conversation upon politics. He asked me what the conduct of his Court and nation ought to be in relation to America. I answered, the alpha and omega of British policy towards America was summed up in this one maxim, see that American independence is independent,—independent of all the world,—independent of yourselves, as well as of France,—and independent of both, as well as the rest of Europe. Depend upon it, you have no chance for salvation, but by setting up America very high; take care to remove from the American mind all cause of fear of you; no other motive but fear of you will ever produce in the Americans any unreasonable attachment to the House of Bourbon. "Is it possible," says he, "that the people of America should be afraid of us, or hate us?" "One would think, Mr Oswald," said I, "that you had been out of the world for these twenty years past; yes, there are three millions of people in America, who hate and dread you more than anything in the world." "What," said he, "now we have come to our senses?" "Your change of system is not yet known in America," said I. "Well," said he, "what shall we do to remove those fears and jealousies?" "In one word," said I, "favor and promote the interest, reputation, and dignity of the United States, in everything that is consistent with your own. If you pursue the plan of cramping, clipping, and weakening America, on the supposition, that she will be a rival to you, you will make her really so; you will make her the natural and perpetual ally of your natural and perpetual enemies." "But in what instance," said he, "have we discovered such a disposition?" "In the three leagues from your shores, and the fifteen leagues from Cape Breton," said I, "to which your Ministry insisted so earnestly to exclude our fishermen. Here was a point, that would have done us great harm, and you no good; on the contrary, harm; so that you would have hurt yourselves to hurt us; this disposition must be guarded against." "I am fully of your mind, about that," said he, "but what else can we do?" "Send a Minister to Congress," said I, "at the peace, a clever fellow, who understands himself, and will neither set us bad examples, nor intermeddle in our parties. This will show, that you are consistent with yourselves; that you are sincere in your acknowledgment of American independence; and that you do not entertain hopes and designs of overturning it. Such a Minister will dissipate many fears, and will be of more service to the least obnoxious refugees, than any other measure could be. Let the King send a Minister to Congress, and receive one from that body. This will be acting consistently, and with dignity, in the face of the universe." "Well, what else shall we do?" said he. "I have more than once already," said I, "advised you to put your Ministers upon negotiating the acknowledgment of our independence by the neutral powers." "True," said he, "and I have written, about it, and in my answers," said he, laughing, "I am charged with speculation; but I do not care, I will write them my sentiments. I will not take any of their money. I have spent already twelve or thirteen hundred pounds, and all the reward I will have for it shall be the pleasure of writing as I think. My opinion is, that our Court should sign the armed neutrality, and announce to them what they have done with you, and negotiate to have you admitted to sign too. But I want to write more fully on the subject, I want you to give me your thoughts upon it, for I do not understand it so fully as I wish. What motives can be thrown out to the Empress of Russia? Or what motives can she be supposed to have to acknowledge your independence? And what motives can our Court have to interfere, or intercede with the neutral powers, to receive you into their confederation?"
"I will answer all these questions," said I, "to the best of my knowledge, and with the utmost candor. In the first place, there has been, with very little interruption, a jealousy between the Court of Petersburg and Versailles for many years. France is the old friend and ally of the Sublime Porte, the natural enemy of Russia. France, not long since, negotiated a peace between Russia and the Turks; but upon the Empress' late offers of mediation, and especially her endeavors to negotiate Holland out of the war, France appears to have been piqued, and, as the last revolution in the Crimea happened soon after, there is reason to suspect that French emissaries excited the revolt against the new independent government, which the Empress had taken so much pains to establish. Poland has been long a scene of competition between Russian and French politics, both parties having spent great sums in pensions to partisans, until they have laid all virtue and public spirit prostrate in that country. Sweden is another region of rivalry between France and Russia, where both parties spent such sums in pensions, as to destroy the principles of liberty, and prepare the way for that revolution, which France favored from a principle of economy, rather than any other. These hints are sufficient to show the opposition of views and interests between France and Russia, and we see the consequence of it, that England has more influence at Petersburg than France. The Empress, therefore, would have two motives, one, to oblige England, if they should intercede for an acknowledgment of American independence, and another, to render America less dependent upon France. The Empress, moreover loves reputation, and it would be no small addition to her glory to undertake a negotiation with all the neutral Courts, to induce them to admit America into their confederacy. The Empress might be further tempted; she was bent upon extending her commerce, and the commerce of America, if it were only in duck and hemp, would be no small object to her. As to the motives of your Court, Princes often think themselves warranted, if not bound, to fight for their glory; surely they may lawfully negotiate for reputation. If the neutral powers should acknowledge our independence now, France will have the reputation, very unjustly, of having negotiated it; but if your Court now takes a decided part in favor of it, your Court will have the glory of it, in Europe and in America, and this will have a good effect upon American gratitude." "But," said he, "this would be negotiating for the honor and interest of France, for no doubt France wishes all the world to acknowledge your independence." "Give me leave to tell you, Sir," said I, "you are mistaken. If I have not been mistaken in the policy of France, from my first observation of it to this hour, they have been as averse to other powers acknowledging our independence as you have been." Mr Jay joined me in the same declaration. "I understand it now," said he; "there is a gentleman going to London this day, I will go home and write upon the subject by him."
Tuesday, December 10th.—Visited Mr Oswald, to inquire the news from England. He had the Courier de l'Europe, in which is Mr Secretary Townshend's letter to the Lord Mayor of London, dated the 3d instant, in which he announces the signature of the preliminaries, on the 30th of November, between the Commissioners of his Majesty, and the Commissioners of the United States of America. He had also the King's speech, announcing the same thing.
Mr Oswald said, that France would not separate her affairs from Spain; that he had hoped that America would have assisted them somewhat, in compromising affairs with France; and Dr Franklin, who was present, said he did not know anything of the other negotiations. He said that neither Mr Fitzherbert, nor the Count de Vergennes, nor the Count d'Aranda, communicated anything to him, that he understood the Dutch were farthest from an agreement. Upon this, I said, "Mr Oswald, Mr Fitzherbert cannot, I think, have any difficulty to agree with M. Brantzen. There are three points, viz. the liberty of navigation; restitution of possessions; and compensation for damages. The liberty of navigation, I suppose, is the point that sticks. But why should it stick? When all nations are agreed in the principle, why should England stand out? England must agree to it, she has already in effect agreed to it; as it affects all nations but Holland and America, and, if she were disposed, she could not prevent them from having the benefit." Upon this, Dr Franklin said, "the Dutch would be able in any future war, to carry on their commerce, even of naval stores, in the bottoms of other neutral powers." "Yes," said Mr Oswald, "and I am of opinion, that England ought to subscribe the armed neutrality." "Very well," said I, "then let Mr Fitzherbert agree to this point with M. Brantzen, and let Mr Harris, at Petersburg, take Mr Dana in his hand, and go to the Prince Potemkin, or the Count d'Ostermann, and say, the king, my master, has authorised me to subscribe the principles of the armed neutrality, and instructed me to introduce to you, Mr Dana, Minister from the United States of America, to do the same. Let him subscribe his name under mine."
At this, they all laughed very heartily. Mr Oswald, however, recollecting himself, and the conversation between him and me, yesterday, on the same subject, very gravely turned it off, by saying, "he did not see a necessity to be in a hurry about that, America was well enough." I said, "as to restitution of the Dutch territories, I suppose your Court will not make much difficulty about that, if this Court does not, as it is not probable they will, and as to compensation for damages, the Dutch will probably be as easy as they can about that."
Dr Franklin said, he was for beginning early to think about the articles of the definitive treaty. We had been so happy as to be the first in the preliminaries, and he wished to be so in the definitive articles. Thus we parted.