The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 07

by Unknown

As Congress have empowered you to remove the obstacles, which have hitherto impeded your negotiations, you will doubtless proceed with prudent despatch in forming the important treaties, which are to be the basis of our national connexion. Your own integrity, and the dispositions which you certainly feel, as the true representative of your Sovereign, to gratify the wishes of his Catholic Majesty, will give you just claim to the confidence and friendly support of his Ministers. And on the other hand, his Majesty's known piety and justice, will certainly induce him to facilitate a permanent union between the two countries, and to overturn that power, whose ambition is known, felt, and detested, throughout the habitable globe.

Having a perfect confidence in the wisdom of his Majesty's Ministers, I must request that you will submit to their consideration the reasons, which operate in favor of the advances we expect. In doing this, it will immediately strike you and them, that the enemy carries on the operations against us at an expense infinitely greater than that by which they are opposed. By enabling us, therefore, to increase our resistance, and redouble our offensive efforts, the British will be reduced to the necessity of increasing their force in America, or of submitting beneath a decided superiority. Either must be fatal to them. In the first instance, they will be crushed by the weight of expense; and, in the second, they must, while they lose an actual force, and part forever with the object in contest, feel the increased weight of the American arms, and make head against those resources, applied to a marine, which are now consumed in land operations.

Money ought, therefore, to be supplied to us from the Havana, which will at the same time save the risk of transporting it to Europe, while, as I have already observed, it must, when employed among us, absolutely ruin the common enemy. For, when once they are driven from the United States, they must, at a considerable expense, defend, or, at a great loss, relinquish the rest of their American possessions; and, in either case, the resources of this country will enable France and Spain to carry on operations for the subjection of the British Islands.

With respect to our finance, I am further to observe, that the resolutions of Congress, of the 18th of March, 1780, have neither been so regularly adopted by the States as was hoped and expected, nor been productive of those consequences, which were intended. It is unnecessary to travel into the causes, or to explain the reasons of this event. The fact is clear. The new money is depreciated, and there is the strong evidence of experience to convince us, that the issuing of paper, at present, must be ineffectual. Taxation has not yet been pursued to that extent, which was necessary. Neither is it reasonable to expect that it should. Time has been required under all governments to accustom the people by degrees to bear heavy burdens. The people of America have so patiently endured the various calamities of the war, that there is good reason to expect they will not shrink at this late hour from the imposition of just and equal taxes. But many arrangements are necessary to this purpose, and, therefore, an immediate pecuniary assistance is the more necessary to us. Our debts, under which I comprise, as well those of the individual States, as those of the Union, are but trifling, when we consider the exertions which have been made. The debt I have already mentioned on certificates is heavy, not from the real amount, but because it is beyond what the supplies obtained were reasonably worth, and because it impedes taxation and impairs its effects. But the amount of other debts so small, that a few years of peace would bring it within the bounds of a revenue very moderate, when compared with the wealth of our country. You well know the rapid increase of that wealth, and how soon it would relieve us from the weight of debts, which might be in the first instance very burdensome. There can, therefore, be no doubt, that we shall be able to pay all those, which it may be necessary to contract. But, as I have already observed, our great difficulty is the want of means in our people, and of credit in our government.

It gives me, however, very great pleasure to inform you, that the determined spirit of the country is by no means abated either by the continuance of the war, the ravages of our enemy, the expense of blood and treasure we have sustained, or the artifices, falsehoods, and delusions of an insidious foe. These last become daily more and more contemptible in America, and it appears equally astonishing, that they should longer attempt them here, or boast the success of such attempts in Europe. Uniform experience has shown the futility of their efforts, and the falsehood of their assertions. I know they take the advantage of every little success to vaunt the prowess of their troops and proclaim hopes of conquest, which they do not feel. But those, who know anything of our history or situation, must have the utmost contempt for all these gasconades. It is impossible they should make impression upon any but weak minds, and I should hardly have thought of mentioning them, but I learn by letters from Spain, that men, who are uninformed, have been led into misapprehensions from circumstances, which were here considered as trivial and even favorable.

I could hardly have supposed that our enemies had still the folly to repeat, as I am told they do, that there is an English party in America. Bribes and deceit have induced some wicked and weak men to join them; but when we consider the sums they have expended, and the falsehoods they have used, our wonder is not, that they have got so many, but that they have gained so few. The independence of America is considered here as established; so much so, that even those of equivocal character accustom themselves to cherish the idea; for the doubt is not now, whether an acknowledgment of it will take place, but when that acknowledgment will be made. Our exertions also, in the present moment, are not so much directed to establish our liberties, as to prevent the ravages of the enemy, abridge the duration and calamities of the war, and faithfully contribute to the reduction of a power, whose ambition was equally dangerous and offensive to every other.

All reasonings on this subject must be deeply enforced, by paying attention to what has happened in the Southern States. The progress of the enemy, while in appearance it menaced the conquest of that extensive region, tended only, in effect, to exhaust him by fruitless efforts, so that at length a handful of men have rescued the whole from his possession. The attack on Virginia (if the piratical incursions there can deserve that name) has been equally futile. The commanders may indeed have enriched themselves by plunder, and many worthy families have been distressed; but what is the consequence? Indignation and resentment have stimulated even the weak and indolent to action. The wavering are confirmed, and the firm are exasperated, so that every hour, and by every operation, they create enemies, instead of gaining subjects.

Our armies, though not very numerous, are powerful. The regular troops are so much improved in discipline and the habits of a military life, that they are at least equal to any troops in the world. Our militia are becoming more and more warlike, so as to supply the wants of regular troops, when the enemy (taking advantage of that convenience, which their ships afford them) transfer the scene of action from one place to another. The number of the British diminishes daily, and of consequence, our superiority becomes daily more decisive. The greatest plenty of subsistence is to be had for our armies, and the prospects from the present harvest are beyond all former experience. I wish I could add, that clothing and military stores were as abundant as those other requisites for war. This is not the case; our soldiers, indeed, are well armed, and, in some degree, they are clothed. We have also ammunition abundantly sufficient for the common operations of the field. But many of our militia are unarmed, and the sieges, which will be necessary to expel the enemy, must make a heavy deduction from our military stores.

The proposed siege of New York will soon be commenced, and would undoubtedly be successful, if we could maintain a decided superiority at sea. This must depend on contingencies, which are not in our power, nor perhaps in the power of any human being. I am not without hopes, even if we should not possess that superiority; but the expense will, from the want of it, be very considerably enhanced, and this is a circumstance which I cannot but deplore, for I repeat it again, the want of money can alone prevent us from making the greatest exertions. What our exertions have already been, our enemies themselves must acknowledge, and while from insidious views, they assert that they could not make an impression on us with ninety thousand soldiers and seamen, we are certainly authorised to conclude from this confession, that these States form a considerable balance in the scale against them.

I am now, therefore, again led to reiterate my request of a considerable sum of money from Spain; for I also again repeat, that small sums are not worth our acceptance, and I may add, they are unworthy the dignity of his Catholic Majesty. There can be no doubt, nor will the Spanish Ministry deny, that there is a considerable risk in transporting their money from the new world to the old, besides, that when expended there, it necessarily runs through the different channels of commerce, to feed the wants and invigorate the forces of the enemy. There is, therefore, a double policy in expending a part of it here, where it can not only be brought with safety and despatch, but be employed to an immense advantage, when compared with its effects in Europe. If it be asked, what advantages Spain will derive in particular during the war, and what recompense can be made her after the peace? I answer, that the weakening more the common enemy by a given sum, is in itself a great advantage, and that to do this, by sparing the blood of Spanish subjects, is an advantage still greater. I add, that when relieved from the enemy, we may assist her in the reduction of the Floridas and Bahamas, and, perhaps, of Jamaica. We shall then, also, be in a situation to secure Nova Scotia, thereby depriving Great Britain of her principal resource for ship-timber, and enable us to furnish that essential article to the navy of Spain, on cheaper and better terms, than it can be had elsewhere. On this last subject, I have further to observe, that there is hardly anything in which the maritime power of Spain is so much interested; for if we do not possess that country, it will be impracticable to furnish those supplies of masts and spars, which both France and Spain may stand in need of; so that, of consequence, their positive and absolute strength at sea will be the less, while that of the enemy is positively and absolutely greater. The comparative inferiority, therefore, will be still more considerable. Nor is this all. A marine requires men, as well as ships. The fisheries and collieries are two pillars, which support the marine of Britain, so far forth as seamen are required. But it is evident, that the fisheries could not long continue in her hands, if she were deprived of Nova Scotia. Here again, we are also to consider, that there is an immense difference between that patient resistance, whose opposition must at length weary the enemy into granting our independence, and those vigorous active operations, which may wrest from them their present possessions. Money is necessary for the latter, and I can say with confidence, that money alone is necessary.