TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, June 16th, 1783.
Sir,
Yesterday afternoon, the duplicate of your letter of the 14th of April, No. 16, was brought in to me, with the post-mark "Brest" upon it. As soon as I had read it, I went out to Passy, in hopes that other despatches had arrived there, but I found none. While I was there, a packet of newspapers addressed to us all was brought in, with the post-mark of Brest on it. I still hope and believe, that other despatches, by the same conveyance, will appear in a few days, but whether they are still in the post office, or whether the Duc de Lauzun intends to bring them in person, is uncertain.
I think, Sir, there is no room to doubt the justice of your opinion, that the latitude of the Canaries is meant, and, consequently, that hostilities ceased on the whole coast of the United States on the 3d of March.
I am well aware, that a variety of questions may be started upon the provisional articles. The great points of sovereignty, limits, and fisheries, are sufficiently clear. But there are too many other things in much obscurity. No one of us alone would ever have put his hand to such a writing. Yet there is no one to blame. It must be confessed, that it was done in haste, but that haste was inevitable. The peace depended absolutely upon the critical moment, when that treaty was signed. The meeting of Parliament was so near, and the state of the Ministry so critical, that if that opportunity had been lost, there would have been at least another campaign. There were never less than three of us, and there were finally no less than three to be consulted on the other side. These inaccuracies are much to be lamented, but they were quite unavoidable. We shall endeavor to explain them in the definitive treaty, but I fear without success.
I hope, Sir, you will excuse me, if I think your expressions fall short of the real merit of the Dutch. If they had accepted the Russian mediation for a separate peace, we should have seen a very formidable difference. The vast weight of the Dutch in the East Indies, being added to that of France, has influenced the minds of the natives in such a manner, as to turn the scale against England. The Cape of Good Hope was indispensable to France, and we are not yet informed what proportion of the expense of French operations in the East Indies is to be borne by the Dutch East India Company, at whose solicitations, by their agents, sent early to Versailles, they were undertaken. From twelve to fifteen British ships of the line, in the best condition, with the best officers and men, have been kept almost constantly in the North seas to watch the Dutch, a momentous diversion, which made the balance more clear in favor of the allies in the East and West Indies, as well as in the Channel; and it may be added, and that with strict truth, the battle of Doggerbank imprinted more terror on the imaginations of the British navy and nation, than all the other sea engagements of the war.
Your observations of their unfortunate situation are, however, very just, and their exertions have not been such as they might and ought to have been. But this was the fault of the enemies of France in Holland, not of their friends, and, unhappily, those enemies are to be gratified by the terms of peace prescribed to that power, and those friends mortified. And this misfortune probably arises from the instructions in question, by which they made themselves of no importance, instead of acting the part of a sovereign, independent, and respectable power. If they had held their own negotiations in their own hands, they would probably have obtained better terms. I could mention many facts and anecdotes of much importance; but these have been communicated to me in confidence, and as this is a discussion that concerns us only indirectly, and as our instructions were parallel to theirs, although the execution of them was different, and the event different, I shall waive any further observations upon the subject.
We are happy to learn, that Congress have ratified the treaty, imperfect as it is, and that each side has released its prisoners. Mr Hartley communicated to us officially, two days ago, that orders were gone to New York to evacuate the United States.
Dr Franklin has never made any use of the bills for my salary, and I have never received any part of them. I shall easily settle that matter when I get home, which your letter encourages me to hope will be very soon. The connexions I have formed in Holland may be of use to the public, wherever I may be, in America, or elsewhere, as well as even in that country itself. Those connexions will readily become those of any Minister Congress may send there. It cost me all my happiness, and had very nearly cost me my life, to form them; it cost me more; it has left me in an ill state of health, which I never shall fully repair. I shall carry Holland in my veins to my grave. It will cost no man anything to go there now. His mind will be at ease, and he will have spirits necessary to take care to preserve his health. To me it has become physically necessary, as well as a moral and religious duty, to join my family. This can be done only by going to them, or bringing them to me; and to bring them to Holland is what I cannot think of, both because, that on account of my own health, as well as theirs, and on other considerations, I should not choose to live among those putrid lakes, and because I think I can do my country more and better service at home than there.