TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
St Petersburg, October 15th, 1781.
Sir,
Since my letter to your Excellency of September 15th, enclosing a duplicate of mine from Berlin, and copies of all the enclosed papers, the French Minister has sent me a copy of all the propositions of the mediators, and of the answer of the Court of Versailles. I have the satisfaction to think the inferences I then drew from the first propositions only, are well supported by the tenor of the second, in which they expressly say, that our particular peace shall not be signed, but conjointly, and at the same time with that of the powers, whose interests shall have been treated of by the mediating powers; that the pacifications, notwithstanding they may be treated separately, shall not be concluded the one without the other; that care shall be taken constantly to inform the mediators of the progress, and of the state of our particular treaty, to the end the mediation may be able to govern itself in the progress of that, which is intrusted to them, according to the state of our particular negotiation, and that both of the pacifications, although they shall have been separately concluded, shall be solemnly guarantied by the mediators, and all other neutral powers, whose guarantee the belligerent powers shall judge proper to ask.
What force are we now to allow to the terms in the first proposition "the American Colonies," and "without the intervention of any of the other belligerent powers, or even that of the two Imperial Courts, unless their mediation has been formally demanded, and granted upon this object?" Is it clear from hence, that the design of the mediators is to avoid exposing themselves by acknowledging the independence of the United States before Great Britain has done this herself? Do not the propositions speak this language to Britain? You may make such a peace with America, not only as she chooses to make with you, but as the other belligerent powers, and we shall choose you should make with her; and remember you are to have no peace in Europe, unless you give peace to America, and when this peace is once made, we will take care you shall not break it. We shall soon see by the replies, which the mediators will give to the belligerent powers, particularly to the Court of Versailles, whether they will recede in favor of Britain from their first plan of pacification, or go on in their next a step further in the spirit of their former system. It seems, that consistent with their own dignity, they can neither retreat or remain on the same ground. The independence of the United States was certainly the basis of the first plan of pacification, and I have no great fears, that it will be departed from.
I have lately been told by a person, who certainly knew the truth of the matter, in so confident a manner that I have no room to doubt it, that it was a secret part of the original plan of the armed neutrality, as soon as it should be completed, that the neutral confederated powers should propose a general pacification between the belligerent powers, which it was supposed could not be brought about otherwise than by leaving America free and independent, and to enforce this proposition by their joint armaments; and that so long ago as in May, 1780, if Holland had done her part, affairs were then in all other quarters in a proper train to have carried the whole plan into execution; but unfortunately for her British influence was too great there, and instead of doing the business at once, they entered upon the parade of sending a brace of Ambassadors to this Court, not with a view to finish, but at least to delay it. Holland, in fact, did not accede to the Marine Convention, which was first entered into by Russia and Denmark on the 9th of July, 1780, and next by Sweden on the 21st of the same month, until the 20th of November following, and it was not signed on their part till the 5th of last January. All this time her navy was neglected, and the mischiefs she has suffered are not the only ones consequent upon her tardiness and inactivity. For Britain has been thereby enabled for a while to detach Denmark from the confederation, or at least to make that Court indifferent in the business of it. It was but a short time after it had adopted the plan before it made a breach upon it by including in a treaty with Britain, hemp, &c. among contraband articles. From that time the spirit of the confederation seems to have languished. The Danish Minister most interested in it has been superseded. Count Panin, who in this Court, it is said, was its principal support, retired. It is true, he has lately returned to Court, but has not assumed his former office of Chief Minister in the Department of Foreign Affairs, though he is still of the Privy Council. My information about the share he has in those affairs is very different; by some I am told, he has little or no influence in them, by others, that he possesses a considerable portion of his former influence, and my informants on both parts ought to, and perhaps do, know the truth of the matter. On one side everything is veiled in profound mystery, and nothing is let out but what presents a discouraging prospect.
It has not such an effect upon my mind at present, and I am strongly encouraged to hope, that the confederation will become properly invigorated by the accession of the King of Prussia. The first open part he took in it, was the issuing his ordinance of the 30th of last April. Soon after this, (the 8th of May) he entered into a similar convention with the Empress. About this time, (the 23d of May,) the propositions for a general pacification were made, and on the 20th of August, both the Prussian and Russian Ministers at the Hague notified to the States-General the accession of his Prussian Majesty to the confederation. Laying these things together, and presuming as I do, that the confederated powers can have no well-grounded hope of reaping any lasting benefit from their confederation, for the maintenance of the liberty of their commerce, and of their navigation, but in the establishment of the independence of the United States, one might conclude with confidence, that all would soon go well between us, if it was confidently to be concluded, that all Courts are governed by the real interests of their countries, even where that is clearly understood, or act upon a permanent system. All now depends upon the stability of the Empress. If she should persevere in the noble line she has marked out, of Sweden and of Russia there is no danger, and it is probable Denmark will not stand out. The Emperor has ceased his opposition to the confederation. The step is now short for him to favor and support it. I believe it may be depended upon, that he has already agreed to accede to it.
If I were to hazard an opinion touching the manner in which our particular business will issue here, it is that the success of it will depend upon the neutral powers consolidating themselves in their confederation; that even after this should take place, our independence will not be acknowledged by this Court before all the neutral confederated powers shall have agreed upon this measure, and are fully prepared to adopt it, and that even Holland waits for this event, although her ease is now different from theirs, by being actually at war with our enemy.
The ground on which the secret part of the original plan of the armed neutrality abovementioned was formed, was an apprehension of the powers engaged in it, that by the loss of America, and by the continuance of the war, the maritime force of Britain might be too much reduced to preserve the balance of power upon the ocean; but as she has not abated of her haughtiness, her injustice, and outrageous violations of the rights of the neutral maritime powers, and still opposes herself to the establishment of a system calculated to secure those rights, and to vindicate the general law of nations, thereby manifesting, that the measure of her power is to prescribe her rule of right, they have become tolerably well reconciled to the idea of seeing her more effectually weakened and humbled.