I observed to the Count, that it would be descending from the ground of independence to treat under the description of Colonies. He replied, that names signified little; that the King of Great Britain's styling himself the King of France was no obstacle to the King of France's treating with him; that an acknowledgment of our independence, instead of preceding, must in the natural course of things be the effect of the treaty, and that it would not be reasonable to expect the effect before the cause. He added, that we must be mindful to exchange powers with Mr Oswald, for that his acceptance of our powers, in which we were styled Commissioners from the United States of America, would be a tacit admittance of our independence. I made but little reply to all this singular reasoning. The Count turned to Dr Franklin and asked him what he thought of the matter. The Doctor said, he believed the commission would do. He next asked my opinion. I told him that I did not like it, and that it was best to proceed cautiously.
On returning, I could not forbear observing to Dr Franklin, that it was evident the Count did not wish to see our independence acknowledged by Britain, until they had made all their uses of us. It was easy for them to foresee difficulties in bringing Spain into a peace on moderate terms, and that if we once found ourselves standing on our own legs, our independence acknowledged, and all our other terms ready to be granted, we might not think it our duty to continue in the war for the attainment of Spanish objects. But, on the contrary, as we were bound by treaty to continue the war till our independence should be attained, it was the interest of France to postpone that event, until their own views and those of Spain could be gratified by a peace, and that I could not otherwise account for the Minister's advising us to act in a manner inconsistent with our dignity, and for reasons, which he himself had too much understanding not to see the fallacy of.
The Doctor imputed this conduct to the moderation of the Minister, and to his desire of removing every obstacle to speedy negotiations for peace. He observed, that this Court had hitherto treated us very fairly, and that suspicions to their disadvantage should not be readily entertained. He also mentioned our instructions, as further reasons for our acquiescence in the advice and opinion of the Minister. A day or two afterwards I paid a visit to Mr Oswald, and had a long conversation with him respecting his commission. On the resignation of Mr Fox, many reports to the prejudice of Lord Shelburne's sincerity, on the subject of American independence, had spread through France as well as through Great Britain. His Lordship, fearful of their effect on the confidence with which he wished to inspire the American commissioners, conveyed by Mr Benjamin Vaughan to Dr Franklin an extract of certain instructions to Sir Guy Carleton, of which the following is a copy, viz.
"June 25th, 1782. It has been said, that 'great effects might be obtained by something being done spontaneously from England.' Upon this and other considerations, his Majesty has been induced to give a striking proof of his royal magnanimity and disinterested wish for the restoration of peace, by commanding his Majesty's Ministers to direct Mr Grenville, that the independence of America should be proposed by him in the first instance, instead of making it the condition of a general peace.
"I have given a confidential information to you of these particulars, that you may take such measures as shall appear to you most advisable for making a direct communication of the substance of the same, either immediately to Congress, or through the medium of General Washington, or in any other manner, which you may think most likely to impress the well disposed parts of America with the fairness and liberality of his Majesty's proceedings in such great and spontaneous concessions.
"The advantages, which we may expect from such concessions are, that America, once apprised of the King's disposition to acknowledge the independence of the thirteen States, and of the disinclination in the French Court to terminate the war, must see that it is from this moment to be carried on with a view of negotiating points, in which she can have no concern, whether they regard France, or Spain and Holland at the desire of France; but some of which, on the contrary, may be in future manifestly injurious to the interests of America herself.
"That if the negotiation is broken off, it will undoubtedly be for the sake of those powers, and not America, whose object is accomplished the instant she accepts of an independence, which is not merely held out to her in the way of negotiation by the executive power, but a distinct unconditional offer, arising out of the resolutions of Parliament, and therefore warranted by the sense of the nation at large.
"These facts being made notorious, it is scarce conceivable that America, composed as she is, will continue efforts under French direction, and protract the distresses and calamities, which it is well known that war has subjected her to. It is to be presumed, that from that moment she will look with jealousy on the French troops in that country, who may from allies become dangerous enemies.
"If, however, any particular States, men, or description of men, should continue against the general inclination of the Continent devoted to France, this communication will surely detect their views, expose their motives, and deprive them of their influence in all matters of general concern and exertion. You will, however, take particular care in your manner of conducting yourselves, not only that there should not be the smallest room for suspicions of our good faith and sincerity, but that we have no view in it of causing dissensions among the colonies, or even of separating America from France upon terms inconsistent with her own honor. You must therefore convince them, that the great object of this country is, not merely peace, but reconciliation with America on the noblest terms and by the noblest means."
In the course of the beforementioned conversation with Mr Oswald, I reminded him, that the judgment and opinion of America respecting the disposition and views of Britain towards her, must be determined by facts and not by professions. That the Enabling Act, and the Commission granted to him in pursuance of it, by no means harmonised with the language of these instructions to Sir Guy Carleton. That unless the offers and promises contained in the latter were realised, by an immediate declaration of our independence, America would naturally consider them as specious appearances of magnanimity, calculated to deceive and disunite them, and, instead of conciliating, would tend to irritate the States. I also urged, in the strongest terms, the great impropriety, and consequently the utter impossibility of our ever treating with Great Britain on any other than an equal footing, and told him plainly, that I would have no concern in any negotiation, in which we were not considered as an independent people.